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choose their strategies in a way that guarantees low adaptive regret, then high social welfare is ensured,
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1. Introduction
The goal of this paper is to understand the quality of outcomes of games and simple mechanisms
in a dynamic environment. The Internet allows for the repeated strategic interaction of many enti-
ties with constantly changing parameters and participants. Primary examples of such interactions
include online advertising auction platforms, packet routing and allocation of cloud computing
resources. Understanding whether the constant change in these strategic environments can severely
damage the efficiency of the corresponding system, as compared to the hypothetical centralized
optimal, is of prime importance as these systems constitute the cornerstone of the online economy.
For example, advertising provides close to 90% of Google’s revenue (Google 2015).
Classical economic analysis of the interaction of strategic agents assumes that players reach a
stable outcome where all players are mutually best-responding to each others’ actions (or consid-
ers mechanisms that are dominant strategy solvable). Dynamic environments, with high volume
interactions of small individual value or cost, such as packet routing or ad-auctions, are better
modeled as repeated games with learning players. Nash equilibria of the one-shot game correspond
to stable outcomes repeated in each iteration, where the players have no regret for their choice of
strategies. Hence, analyzing the quality of outcomes in repeated games via the price of anarchy
(Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou 1999) assumes that the repeated game reaches a stable, station-
ary outcome. Such an analysis of price of anarchy of one-shot Nash equilibria has received large
attention in the past few years in both the computer science and operations research community
and in a plethora of application domains such as routing games (Roughgarden and Tardos 2002,
Correa et al. 2003), bandwidth allocation (Johari and Tsitsiklis 2004), strategic supply among
firms (Johari and Tsitsiklis 2011) and online ad-auctions (Caragiannis et al. 2015) (see e.g. Chap-
ters 17 to 21 of (Nisan et al. 2007) for a survey).
A more attractive model of player behavior in such repeated environments is to assume players
use a form of algorithmic learning. Modeling players as learners is especially appealing in online
auctions, as individual auctions provide very little value, costing only a few cents to a few dollars
each, so using experimentation to learn from the data is natural. Many advertisers use sophisticated
optimization tools or services to optimize their bidding, such as Bluekai1 or AdRoll2.
It is well known that in most games natural game play does not lead to equilibria, under any
definition of “natural play” (see e.g. Chapter 7 of (Hart and Mas-Colell 2012)). In fact, results on
polynomial time computability of Nash equilibria of general games are mostly negative: finding
equilibria is computationally hard (see (Daskalakis 2009) for a survey).
1 http://www.oracle.com/us/corporate/acquisitions/bluekai/index.html, accessed 10-03-2015
2 https://www.adroll.com/, accessed 10-03-2015
3Even with computational concerns aside, the game that the participants are playing at each
time-step and the participants they are playing against, can change at any time without even the
players realizing it or being able to form any distributional belief. Hence, even the concept of a
Nash equilibrium is debatable in such an adversarially evolving setting, as the players don’t even
have the information necessary to calculate their expected utility at each time-step. Instead they
observe their utility from the action they took or from any alternative action they could have taken,
only after the fact. In such an evolving setting, players can base their actions on past experience.
A particular class of learning behaviors, no-regret learning, emerged as a nice way to capture
the intuition that players learn to play appropriate strategies over time without necessitating
convergence to a stationary equilibrium. A stationary distribution that is also a no-regret learning
outcome corresponds to a Nash equilibrium of the one shot game, and in this sense, learning
outcomes generalize Nash equilibrium. More importantly, there are several simple and natural
algorithms that achieve the no-regret property (e.g. regret matching (Hart and Mas-Colell 2000),
multiplicative weight updates (Arora et al. 2012)). However, no-regret does not preclude the use
of possibly much more sophisticated tools, including using the above learning algorithms with
more complex benchmarks. Achieving small regret is a relatively simple expectation from bid
optimization tools.
Blum et al. (2006, 2008) consider regret-minimization as a model of player behavior in repeated
games, and study the average inefficiency of the outcome, coining the term price of total anarchy
for the worst-case ratio between the optimal objective value and the average objective value when
players use a no-regret algorithm. In a sequence of play all players achieve the no-regret property, if
and only if the empirical distribution of strategy vectors is a coarse correlated equilibrium, hence the
price of total anarchy is the ratio of the socially optimal welfare to the welfare at the worst coarse
correlated equilibrium. Roughgarden (2009) observed that many of the Nash equilibrium price
of anarchy bounds are shown via a proof technique he called smoothness, and such proofs easily
extend also to show bounds on the quality of coarse correlated equilibria. Syrgkanis and Tardos
(2013) extend smoothness to simple mechanisms, such as independent item auctions.
However, this learning outcome analysis is based on the strong assumption that the underlying
environment and player population is stable. The reason for this requirement is easy to understand:
with the game and the players stable, there is a fixed optimal solution, and a fixed strategy, that
each player i would need to play (action a∗i ) as his or her part for achieving the optimum. To
guarantee high social welfare via the smoothness approach, all we need is that each player i doesn’t
regret not playing this optimal action a∗i . No-regret learning guarantees exactly this; player i will
not regret any fixed strategy with hindsight, including strategy a∗i . However, online environments
are typically not stable.
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In this paper, we study learning outcomes in games with a dynamically changing player pop-
ulation. As stated in (Fudenberg and Levine 1998, p. 4), the fact that players extrapolate across
games they view as similar is an important reason learning has relevance in a real-world situation.
A repeated game with an evolving population is exactly a setup where players are asked to play
repeatedly in similar games. Rather than aiming to predict the exact outcome, our goal is to predict
properties of outcomes, such as their efficiency, i.e. the price of anarchy.
In a changing game environment, we need a slightly stronger notion of regret minimization.
No-regret learning aims to select strategies that do at least as well on the average over a sequence
of steps as the best single strategy would have done in hindsight. With the game environment and
population changing, a single best strategy in hindsight gives a really weak benchmark. Players,
using good learning algorithms, should be able to adapt to the changing environment, and such
adaptation may be very useful with the population changing over time. For example, in the con-
text of routing games, a player with many route options, may want to adjust their route choices
depending which part of the network is more congested, or in auction games, a player may want
to bid for items that are less in demand.
Hazan and Seshadhri (2007) formally introduced the stronger notion of adaptive regret that we
will use, bounding the average regret over any sub-interval of steps [τ1, τ2), compared to a single
best action over this interval in hindsight. The study of adaptive learning goes back much further:
the work of Lehrer (2003) and Blum and Mansour (2007) studied generalizations of adaptive regret
prior to (Hazan and Seshadhri 2007). Clearly short intervals will result in relatively high regret with
any learning algorithm, but adaptive learning algorithms guarantee for the player that the cumu-
lative regret grows sub-linearly with the length of the interval. Most adaptive learning algorithms
are constructed by modifying classical no-regret learning algorithms to stop relying too heavily
on experience from the distant past. We believe that such adaptive learning is a better model of
behavior when strategic agents (such as bidders in online auctions) use sophisticated optimization
tools. The current best adaptive learning algorithm is a natural adaptation of the classical Hedge
algorithm, AdaNormalHedge, due to Luo and Schapire (2015). With this framework in mind, we
ask the following main question:
How much rate of change can a system admit to sustain approximate efficiency, when its
participants are adaptive learners?
Our Results. We show that in large classes of games, if players choose their strategies in a
way that guarantees low adaptive regret, this ensures high social welfare, even under surprisingly
high turnover. To model a changing environment we consider a dynamic player population where
between every pair of iterations each player leaves independently with a (small) probability p and
is replaced by an arbitrary new player, implying that in expectation a p fraction of the population
5is replaced. The independent departure probability models churn in player population caused by
effects that are external to the game. We make no assumptions on the sequence of arriving players,
which can be chosen in an adversarial way. We use independence of departures for simplicity of
presentation, and most of our results carry over to any process where the departing players are
also chosen adversarially, subject to a constraint on the number of per-step replacements. This
model of the environment is simple enough to allow a clean analysis, and allows arbitrary worst
case shifts in player populations.
We show that learning behavior ensures high social welfare in dynamic situations with high
churn for four classes of games:
• In Section 4.1 we consider an item auction game with unit demand bidders. At each period
the auction sells m different items, and the bidders have value for at most one item per-period.
The value of player i for each item j is different and is denoted by vij . We consider a simple auction
format: each item is auctioned independently (via a first or second price auction). We show that
adaptive learning by players ensures high social welfare (i.e. price of anarchy close to 4), even when
the probability p of player departure is close to a constant (independent of the number of items or
players, and depends only on the range of values that players have).
• In Section 4.2, we consider a bandwidth allocation: a unit of bandwidth is to be divided across
the players of the game and each player i has a valuation function vi(x) for bandwidth x. We
consider the proportional mechanism of Kelly (1997), analyzed in Johari and Tsitsiklis (2011), and
show a price of anarchy close to 4 under mild assumptions on the utility functions and even with
high player turnover.
• In Section 5.2 we prove that in large dynamic congestion games learning by players ensures
low social cost even with a dynamically changing player population. For example, when the costs
are a linear function of the congestion, we get a price of anarchy guarantee close to the 5/2 price
of anarchy of the corresponding one-shot atomic congestion game, even if a 1/polylog(n) fraction
of the n players are changing at each time-step.
• In Section 5.3 we consider auction games where bidders have gross substitute valuations.
Extending the results of Section 4.1, we prove that in large dynamic markets, learning by players
ensures high social welfare, i.e. price of anarchy close to 2, even if a 1/polylog(n) fraction of the n
players are changing at each time-step.
We achieve these results by developing a general technique (in Section 3) to show that in many
games adaptive learners achieve high social welfare in dynamically changing environments. Our
technique is based on the following three conditions:
1. All players are adaptive learners, i.e. they choose their strategies in a way that guarantees
small adaptive regret on the outcome (for instance, using an adaptive learning algorithm). In
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deriving concrete bounds, we assume that players use adaptive learning algorithm with the best
known bound of (Luo and Schapire 2015) or (Blum and Mansour 2007). Our results deteriorate
gracefully with weaker assumptions on the regret of learning.
2. The game repeated in each state (called stage) needs to have low price of anarchy. In partic-
ular, we need that the game satisfies a slight strengthening of the (Roughgarden 2009) smoothness
property (or the smooth mechanisms property of (Syrgkanis and Tardos 2013)), which is typically
used to prove price of anarchy guarantees.
3. There exists a sequence of solutions for the underlying optimization problem that is approxi-
mately optimal, and where on average each player’s part of the solution is stable, i.e. doesn’t change
much over time.
With our model of players leaving the game independently with probability p at each step, on
average each player is expected to participate in 1/p rounds of the game, which turns out to be long
enough to learn good strategies. On the other hand, players will experience dynamic population
changes, and with no assumption on arriving players, they will need to adapt to the changing
environment. With a player population of size n, and each player being replaced with turnover
probability p, after each step we have np new players in expectation, so the population is constantly
changing. We use an approximately optimal solution where each player’s allocation is relatively
stable as a benchmark for each player; a stable enough benchmark that will allow adaptive learners
to learn how to play at least as well as this solution. We will be interested in understanding what
value of p is needed to guarantee high social welfare.
To apply the above outline to a game, we need to develop techniques for point 3 above: show
that there exists a stable sequence of close to optimal solutions in our changing environment. We
present two ways to achieve this stability. In Section 4, we consider solution sequences that are
produced by greedy algorithms where a turnover in the input has only local influence in the output.
In Section 5, we consider solution sequences that are produced by differentially private algorithms
where a turnover in the input affects the whole output but only with a small probability.
Our first application, via the greedy algorithm approach, is the unit demand auction problem
analyzed in Section 4.1. In a unit-demand auction, after a change in one player, we could recompute
the optimal solution by an augmenting path algorithm. Unfortunately, a single augmenting path
can change the assignment of many (or even all) players, and hence in no sense is the evolving
optimal solution stable. Such major changes can happen even if the player valuations are all 0 or 1.
We develop a greedy algorithm that finds stable solution sequences losing only a factor of 2 from
the optimum value. To illustrate the idea, observe that in the special case of 0/1 values a greedy
matching is essentially stable, and has size at least 1/2 of the optimal matching. In Section 4.1
we extend this idea beyond 0/1 valuations and give stable solution sequences to the unit demand
7auction problem. We use this algorithm to show that players using adaptive learning guarantee high
social welfare in the item auction game with unit demand bidder even with a dynamically changing
player population, allowing for a probability p of player departure that depends logarithmically on
the range of values players have, and does not depend on the number of items or players.
Another application of the greedy algorithm approach is the bandwidth allocation problem
(Section 4.2), where some bandwidth is divided across players with smooth concave valuation
functions. Segmenting the bandwidth in small parts and viewing each segment as an item, we
provide an almost optimal greedy approximation algorithm with similar stability guarantees as in
the unit-demand auction setting.
In Section 5 we develop a general method for applying our framework via the use of differential
privacy. Differential privacy has been developed by Dwork et al. (2006) for (approximately) answer-
ing queries of databases of private information, while protecting the privacy of data. Consider a
database of sensitive personal information (such as medical data). The framework of differential
privacy has been developed to allow us to take advantage of the statistical information in the
database without compromising the privacy of the individuals. A differentially private response
to a database query is randomized, and it requires that if two databases differ only in the data
related to one individual, the probability that the response differs is very small. In recent years
many optimization problems have been shown to be solvable in a differentially private way (see
the recent book of Dwork and Roth (2014)).
The requirement of differential privacy for a solution to an optimization problem is very close to
what we need for our stable solution sequences: if there is a differentially private close to optimal
solution, this immediately implies that the solution cannot change much as one person’s data
changes. We will be using a variant of the notion of differential privacy adapted to game theoretic
environments, joint differential privacy (Kearns et al. 2014). Player i’s share of any reasonable
solution must depend on his/her own input, so a solution cannot be fully differentially private.
Joint differential privacy fixes this discrepancy. In fact, the notion of marginal differential privacy
of Kannan et al. (2014) seems even more appropriate, as it only requires that the output for each
player j is differentially private in the data of other players. In order to take advantage of differential
privacy in the context of dynamically changing games, we need to overcome an important technical
difficulty: with the output of the differentially private algorithm randomized, the natural measure
of change in a sequence of such outputs is the sum of the total variation distances between adjacent
pairs of distributions. We need to turn the sequence of output distributions with low total variation
distance into a distribution of stable output sequences. We do this in Section 5 for joint differential
privacy. In Appendix EC.2 we show how to adapt our analysis to the weaker notion of marginal
differential privacy.
8 Lykouris, Syrgkanis and Tardos: Learning and Efficiency in Games with Dynamic Population
We illustrate the differential privacy approach via two applications. In Section 5.2 we use the
differentially private algorithm of Rogers et al. (2015) for congestion games to prove that in large
dynamic congestion games players using adaptive learning guarantees low social cost even with a
dynamically changing player population. In Section 5.3 we use differentially private algorithms of
Hsu et al. (2014) for a matchings and allocations with gross substitute valuations to prove that
in large dynamic markets players using adaptive learning guarantees high social welfare even with
a dynamically changing player population. For simplicity of presentation, we focus on first price
auctions in Sections 4.1 and 5.3, but our results apply also to second price auction (assuming no
overbidding) as well as any hybrids of the two auction formats. In this setting we show, roughly,
that if we have a smoothness-based price of anarchy bound for the single-shot game then, in the
dynamic population setting, the price of anarchy is ǫ close to the same bound assuming that
p=O(ǫ5/polylog(n)), as long as the market is large enough, in the sense that the supply of goods
is large enough. The simultaneous first price auction gives a price of anarchy bound of 2. Thus
even if approximately n/ log(n) players are changing at each time-step, a constant inefficiency is
guaranteed.
As a benchmark for the latter two results, it is interesting to consider a simpler model of dynamic
player population, where the departure or arrival of a player is announced to all players. We expect
np new players each step, so in expectation there will be 1/(np) steps with no change at all. If
all the changes are announced, players could be expected to restart their learning algorithms due
to the change. If the stable period 1/(np) is long enough, we can use results for the total price of
anarchy to guarantee high social welfare. Under standard no-regret learning algorithms each player
will then have average regret approximately O(
√
n · p). Hence, if we want the regret in the system
to be at most an ǫ fraction of the optimal welfare and hence contribute only an ǫ to the inefficiency,
we would require that p= O(ǫ2/n). In other words, the probability that any player changes in a
period needs to be ǫ2/n, which is a tiny rate of change for large n.
Our results are stronger than what is implied by this argument in two ways. First, we do not
assume that change is announced, rather, we take advantage of the fact that players using learning
algorithms can adjust to the changing environment even without the announcement of the change.
More importantly, our results allow a probability of change much higher than the required by the
above argument. The resulting dynamic game will not have long periods with no change. Multiple
players will be arriving and leaving at each step. We show that in many games, despite the constant
change, there exists a good benchmark of the kind mentioned in the conditions above, where each
player’s individual solution or allocation is relatively stable. The rate of expected change np in
our applications will turn out to be high, especially as the number of players increases. Roughly
speaking, if we want the regret of the players to be an ǫ fraction of the optimal welfare, we will only
9require that p=O (poly(ǫ)/polylog(n)), where the constants depend on several parameters of each
game at hand, but importantly depends only logarithmically in the number of players. Moreover,
in some games we even give a bound that is independent of n. Hence, for any constant ǫ we allow
almost a constant fraction of players to be changing at each period.
Further related work on dynamic games. Dynamic games have a long history in economics,
dynamical systems and operations research, see for example the survey books of Baar and Olsder
(1998) and Van Long (2010). The classic approach of analyzing behavior in such dynamic games
is to assume that players have prior beliefs about their competitors and that their behavior will
constitute a perfect Bayesian equilibrium or refinements of it such as the sequential equilibrium
of Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) or Markov perfect equilibrium of Maskin and Tirole (2001). The
intractability of such equilibrium solution concepts and the informational and rationality assump-
tions that they impose on the players casts doubt on whether players in practice and in complex
game theoretic environments such as packet routing or internet ad-auctions would behave as pre-
scribed by such an equilibrium behavior.
Equilibrium-like behavior might be more plausible in large game approximations (see e.g. recent
work of Kalai and Shmaya (2015)). A natural approximation to equilibrium behavior in large game
situations that has been recently extensively analyzed in economics and in operations research
(and particularly, in auction settings) is that of the mean field equilibrium (Balseiro et al. 2015,
Weintraub et al. 2006, 2008, Adlakha et al. 2015, Iyer et al. 2014, Adlakha and Johari 2013). How-
ever, even these large game approximations require the players to form almost correct beliefs about
the competition and exactly best-respond to these approximate large-market beliefs. Moreover, the
approach requires that the environment either is stochastically stable or evolves in a known stochas-
tic manner and in most situations the mean field approach captures behavior at a stochastically
stable state of the system. On the contrary our dynamic model allows for adversarial changes and
our analysis attempts to analyze even constantly evolving and never converging behavior. More-
over, our assumption that players invoke adaptive learning algorithms does not impose that players
possess or form any beliefs on the competition. Most of the algorithms that achieve adaptive regret
only require that the player is able to see the utility that each of his strategic options would have
given in-retrospect, in past time-steps. Last our approach also applies in small markets.
There is also a large literature on truthful mechanisms in a dynamic setting analogous to our
dynamic player population model, where the goal is to truthfully implement a desired outcome
with dynamically changing populations of users with private value. This line of work goes back
to Parkes and Singh (2003) in the computer science literature, but has been also considered much
earlier with queuing models by Dolan (1978). In a more recent work Cavallo et al. (2010) offers a
generalized VCG mechanism in an environment very similar to the one we are considering with
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departures and arrivals, and also provides a nice overview of work in truthful mechanisms in a
dynamic setting. For a more complete overview, the reader is referred to the survey on dynamic
auctions by Bergemann and Said (2010).
Further related work on learning in games. There is a large literature analyzing learning in
games, dating back to the work on fictitious play by Brown (1951). For an overview of this area,
the reader is referred to the books of Fudenberg and Levine (1998) and Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi
(2006). A standard notion of learning in games is that of no-regret learning. The notion of no-
regret against the best fixed action in hindsight dates back to the work of Hannan (1957), and is
also referred as, Hannan consistency. There are many learning algorithms achieving this guarantee
such as regret matching by Hart and Mas-Colell (2000) and multiplicative weights updates by
Freund and Schapire (1997).
Related work on learning in dynamic environments. The notion of no-regret learning against
time-varying benchmarks, as opposed to fixed actions, traces back to Herbster and Warmuth (1998)
who provided guarantees compared to the best sequence of k experts. The stronger notion of adap-
tive regret, i.e. having guarantees for every sub-interval was formalized by Hazan and Seshadhri
(2007) and near-optimal adaptive regret guarantees were achieved through a series of algorithms
by Lehrer (2003), Blum and Mansour (2007), Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2012), and Luo and Schapire
(2015). One important trait of these algorithms is that they display some sort of recency bias, in
the sense that the influence of past steps decays as time goes by. Recent experimental evidence
by Fudenberg and Peysakhovich (2014) suggests that humans display such forms of recency bias
when making repeated decisions.
Competing against an adaptive benchmark has also been studied in the context of online convex
optimization. Besbes et al. (2013) compare to a target function that is changing from step to step.
In order to guarantee some stability across steps they require that the total variation distance
between subsequent target functions is bounded by some number. This is a way to capture the
notion that subsequent rounds are not very different, related to our notion of turnover probability
which in expectation guarantees a similar stability bound on the number of changes per step.
2. Preliminaries
Games and mechanisms. We will consider a game played repeatedly, where the population of
players is drifting over time. Let G be an n-player normal form stage game and assume that game
G is played repeatedly T times. Each player i who participates in a stage game has a strategy space
Si, with maxi |Si| = N , a type vi ∈ Vi and a cost function ci(s;vi) that depends on the strategy
profile s∈×iSi, and on his type. We will denote with C(s;v) =
∑
i∈[n] ci(s;vi) the social cost, where
s is a strategy profile and v a type profile. We will also analyze the case when the stage game
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is a utility maximization mechanism M , which takes as input a strategy profile and outputs an
allocation Xi(s) for each player and a payment Pi(s). We will assume that players have quasi-linear
utility ui(s;vi) = vi(Xi(s))− Pi(s) and the welfare is the sum of valuations (sum of utilities of
bidders and revenue of auctioneer): W (s;v) =
∑
i∈[n] vi(Xi(s)).
In all the games that we study, the optimal social welfare problem can equivalently be defined as
an optimization over a “feasible solution space” X n which involves no incentives (e.g. in network
congestion games it is the set of feasible integral flows, in a combinatorial auction setting it is the
set of feasible partitions of items to bidders, in the bandwidth allocation setting it is the set of
valid partitions of the bandwidth). We will overload the social cost and welfare notations, and for
a feasible solution (or allocation) x∈X n we will use C(x;v) and W (x;v) to denote the social cost
or welfare of the solution. We denote the optimal social cost or welfare for a type profile v, as
Opt(v) =minx∈XnC(x;v) and Opt(v) =maxx∈XnW (x;v) respectively.
Definition 2.1 (Repeated game/mechanism with dynamic population). A repeated
game with dynamic population consists of a stage game G played for T time steps. Let P t denote
the set of players at time t, where each player i ∈ P t has a private type vti . After each step, every
player independently exits the game with a (small) probability p > 0 and is replaced by a new
player with an arbitrary type. The utility of a player is additive across steps. We denote this
repeated game with Γ = (G,T, p). Similarly, we denote with M = (M,T,p) a mechanism that is
played T times with player replacement probability p.
Our model of dynamic population assumes that after each step every player independently exits
the game with a probability p> 0, so each player is expected to play the game for 1/p rounds. To
keep our model simple, we make the assumption that when a player exits, she is replaced by a new
participant. This assumption guarantees that we will have exactly n players in each iteration, with
a p fraction of the population changing each iteration in expectation. We make no assumption
about the types of the new arriving players which can be picked adversarially. Most of our results
could be extended to the case when the players that are being replaced is also chosen adversarially,
subject to some constraint on the number of per-step replacements.
To simplify the notation, we will use player i to denote the current ith player, where this player is
replaced by a new ith player with probability p each round. An alternate view of the dynamic player
population is to think of players as changing types after each iteration with a small probability p.
We will refer to such a change as player i switches or turns over.
Basic notation. For any quantity x we will denote with x1:T the sequence x1, . . . , xT . For instance,
v1:Ti will denote the sequence of types of player i produced by the random choice of leaving players
and by the choices of the adversary.
We will consider three special classes of games, two welfare-maximization mechanisms and one
cost-minimization game:
12 Lykouris, Syrgkanis and Tardos: Learning and Efficiency in Games with Dynamic Population
First-price Auction Game. The auction games we consider are defined by a set of m goods,
where we will assume that each good has a supply of s identical copies in each iteration. We assume
for simplicity of presentation that the supply of each item is identical. The players are buyers who
repeatedly participate in item auctions to buy copies of the items. Each buyer wants at most one
copy of each item. The type of a buyer i is her valuation over sets of items.
We will use vti(A) to denote the valuation of the i-th player in iteration t, if he gets at least one
copy of each item in set A⊂ [m]. We will assume, that valuations are non-negative and at most
1. Last we will assume that conditional on having a set S, the marginal value of a player for any
extra item j, i.e. vti({j} ∪S)− vti(S) is either 0 or at least some constant ρ. Valuations over time
are additive, which models perishable items, such as advertising opportunity, where a player will
play to repeatedly win items in each period she is participating.
We will focus the presentation on first price item auctions, where players submit a bid on each
item separately: if we have s copies of an item, the s highest bidders for the item get one copy each,
and pay their bid (ties are broken arbitrarily). The bid on each item comes from some sufficiently
fine, discrete bid space. Specifically, bids are multiples of δ ·ρ for some small δ and lie in [0,1]. Our
results also extend to second price auctions, as well as hybrid auctions.
In our first application (in Section 4.1) we will consider unit demand buyers and the supply of
each item is arbitrary. Thus a buyer’s value for any set of items in one iteration is their value for
the best single item in the set they acquired. For the case of unit demand, we use vti(j) to denote
the value of an item j for buyer i at time t, so the player’s value for a set A is vti(A) =maxj∈A v
t
i(j).
In this application, we will assume that players will bid for at most one item at each iteration.
Thus the number of strategies available to each player is N = m
δ·ρ .
In Section 5.3 we consider large markets of first price item auctions with players that have more
complex valuations satisfying the gross substitute property. In this application, we will assume that
players want at most d types of different items, i.e. for any set A: vti(A) =maxT⊂A:|T |=d v
t
i(T ) and
we assume that they will bid on only d different auctions. Thus the number of strategies available
to them is N =
(
m
d
)(
1
δ·ρ
)d
≤
(
m
δ·ρ
)d
.
Proportional bandwidth allocation mechanism. The proportional bandwidth allocation mecha-
nism, introduced by Kelly (1997) and first studied for price of anarchy by Johari and Tsitsiklis
(2011), is defined by a bandwidth of B and a valuation function for each player which is concave
on the bandwidth she receives. At every round, each player i submits a bid bti, pays her bid and
gets allocated bandwidth proportional to her bid, i.e. xi(b
t) =
bti∑
j b
t
j
.
In this setting the type of the player is her valuation function. We will use vti(xi) to denote
player i’s valuation for bandwidth xi. We will make the assumption for the valuation functions
that their slope will be lower bounded by some ρ > 0. Player i’s utility will be again quasilinear, i.e.
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uti(b) = v
t
i(xi(b
t))− bti. Similarly as before, we will assume that bids will be only multiples of ρδ for
some δ > 0. Therefore bidding space is sufficiently discrete and the number of strategies available
is at most N = 1
ρδ
.
Atomic congestion game. In the atomic congestion game, we assume that we have a set of
congestible elements E (and let m= |E|), each element e has a latency function ℓe(x), or cost, that
is monotone non-decreasing in the congestion x. Given some selection of sets si ⊆E for each player
i, the congestion in an element e is the number of players that have selected it: xe(s) = |{i : e∈ si}|,
and the cost of player i is then the sum
∑
e∈si ℓe(xe(s)).
A player’s type vti denotes the possible subsets of the element set she can select. For example, in
the routing game on a graph, the type of a player i is a source-sink pair (oi, di), and her strategy
is the choice of a path from oi to di in the graph. We assume that a player’s cost is infinity if her
solution is not one of the selected sets. Thus the number of strategies available to the player is
the number of (oi, di), paths in the graph and thereby N is the maximum number of such possible
paths across possible source-sink pairs.
Adaptive Learning in Dynamic Environments. We use the notion of adaptive regret introduced
by Hazan and Seshadhri (2007). We start by defining no-regret learning, and then consider adaptive
regret. To formally define regret, and no-regret learning, we consider an arbitrary loss function. For
a cost-game, we will think of the cost the player incurs as loss. For a utility game, we define loss
each step as the difference between the maximum possible utility and the player’s utility. Consider
a player who has N possible choices, the N strategies that the player has to choose from. In defining
regret, and no-regret learning we are focusing on a single player, and hence we will temporarily
drop the index i for the player from the notation. We use L(s, t) to denote the loss (cost or lost
utility) of the player if she plays strategy s at time t. We can assume without loss of generality
that L(s, t) is a value in [0,1], but make no assumption beyond this about the sequence of loss
values. We say that a player achieves no-regret, if she does at least as well over a period of time,
as the best choice s∗ with hindsight. Formally, we say the regret of a strategy sequence s1:T is
T∑
t=1
L(st, t)−min
s∗
L(s∗, t)
Note that even with a stable set of players the value L(s, t) will vary over time, depending of the
strategies chosen by other players. As mentioned in the Introduction, there are many simple algo-
rithms (see, for example, (Arora et al. 2012)) that achieve regret O(
√
T ) against any (adversarial)
sequence of loss values L(s, t).
In dealing with changing environments, we will need a stronger assumption on the learning of the
players, we need that the players adapt their strategies to the environment. We will use a notion of
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adaptive regret, regret over (long) intervals of time [τ1, τ2), in addition to the regret of the whole
sequence, defined by Hazan and Seshadhri (2007).
Definition 2.2 (Adaptive Regret). The adaptive regret of strategy sequence s1:T in time
frame [τ1, τ2) is defined as:
R(τ1, τ2) =max
s∗
τ2−1∑
t=τ1
(L(st, t)−L(s∗, t))
Adaptive learning algorithms go back to the work of Lehrer (2003) and Blum and Mansour (2007)
who considered more general notions of regret. We say that a player satisfies adaptive learning if
her regret R(τ1, τ2) can be bounded by a function that is o(τ2 − τ1), that is, regret grows slower
than linearly over time. Our results are affected by the quality of the learning algorithm players
use, as with better learning we can tolerate higher turnover in the population of players. In the rest
of the paper we will use the learning bounds of the recent work of Luo and Schapire (2015), who
developed an adaptation of the classical Hedge algorithm, AdaNormalHedge that achieves small
regret on all intervals. An alternate algorithm with a bound of the same type was also given in
(Blum and Mansour 2007).
Theorem 2.1 ((Luo and Schapire 2015)). Suppose a player uses AdaNormalHedge and
selected strategy sequence s1:T . For any time frame [τ1, τ2), AdaNormalHedge achieves adaptive
regret:
E(R(τ1, τ2))≤CR
√
(τ2− τ1) ln(Nτ2)
where N is the number of choices, CR is a small constant less than 2, and loss is assumed to be in
[0,1] for all s and t.
In what follows, we will assume that all players in our repeated game use a learning algorithm
with low adaptive regret, will use Ri(τ1, τ2) to denote the adaptive regret of player i over the period
[τ1, τ2]. For simplicity of presentation, we will assume that, for some constant CR, E(R(τ1, τ2))≤
CR
√
(τ2− τ1) ln(Nτ2) for all players and all time periods [τ1, τ2). Throughout the paper, we will
refer to this assumption as “The players use adaptive learning algorithms with constant CR.” Our
results would smoothly degrade if we assumed only that players achieve adaptive regret that is
some other sublinear concave function of the interval’s length (τ2− τ1).
Solution-based Smoothness in Games and Mechanisms. Smooth games were introduced by
Roughgarden (2009) as a general framework bounding the price of anarchy in games. He also
showed that smoothness based price of anarchy bounds extend to outcomes in repeated games
when all players use no-regret learning.
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We need a somewhat more general variant of smooth games, that compares the cost or utility
resulting from a strategy choice to the social welfare of a specific solution, rather than comparing
to the social optimum. For two strategy vectors s and s∗ we use (s∗i , s−i) to denote the vector where
player i uses strategy s∗i and all other players j use their strategy sj.
Definition 2.3 (Solution-based smooth game). A cost-minimization game G is (λ,µ)-
smooth with respect to a solution x, if for some λ > 0 and µ < 1, for any type profile v, for each
player i there is a strategy s∗i ∈ Si depending on his type vi and her part of the solution xi such
that for any strategy profile s
∑
i
ci(s
∗
i (vi, xi), s−i;vi)≤ λC(x;v)+µC(s;v)
A game G is solution-based (λ,µ)-smooth if it is smooth with respect to any feasible solution
x∈X n.
Note that, when x is the optimal solution, we recover the traditional examples of smooth games, as
the deviating strategy s∗ usually depends on other players’ types through his part of the optimal
solution x∗i (v). A game that is (λ,µ)-smooth with respect to the optimal solution x
∗(v) is (λ,µ)-
smooth in the sense of (Roughgarden 2009), and the game has price of anarchy bounded by λ/(1−
µ), and the average social cost of no-regret learning outcomes is also bounded by λ/(1− µ)Opt.
More generally,
Theorem 2.2. If a game is (λ,µ)-smooth with respect to a solution x, then at any Nash equilibria
of the game, as well as at any no-regret learning outcome, the expected cost is at most λ
1−µC(x;v).
Proof of Theorem 2.2. We include the proof for the case of pure Nash equilibria for complete-
ness. Consider a strategy vector s that is a Nash equilibrium. At a Nash equilibrium, no player has
regret for any alternate strategy, so in particular we get that ci(s
∗
i (vi, xi), s−i;vi)≥ ci(s;vi) for all
i. Adding up these inequalities and using the smoothness property, we get
C(s;v) =
∑
i∈[n]
ci(s;vi)≤
∑
i
ci(s
∗
i (vi, xi), s−i;vi)≤ λC(x;v)+µC(s;v) (2.1)
The claimed bound follows by rearranging the terms. The proof extends to randomized equilibria
by taking expectations, including the distribution resulting in no-regret learning in the limit. 
Syrgkanis and Tardos (2013) give a related definition for smooth mechanisms assuming quasi-
linear valuation for all players. Again, we define a mechanism smooth with respect to a solution x,
and allow the choice of strategy s∗ to depend on the player’s part of the solution xi and his type
vi. More formally, we will use the following definition.
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Definition 2.4 (Solution-based smooth mechanism). A mechanism M is (λ,µ)-smooth
with respect to a solution x for some λ,µ≥ 0 if for any valuation profile v for each player i there
exists a deviating strategy s∗i ∈ Si depending on vi and xi such that for all strategy vectors s,∑
i
ui(s
∗
i (vi, xi), s−i;vi)≥ λW (x;v)−µR(s).
where R(s) =∑ni=1Pi(s). M is a solution-based (λ,µ)-smooth mechanism if the latter holds for
any feasible solution x∈X n.
Syrgkanis and Tardos (2013) proved that a (λ,µ)-smooth mechanism has price of anarchy
bounded by max(µ,1)/λ, and the average social welfare of no-regret learning outcome is also at
least (λ/max(µ,1))Opt(v). Analogously we get:
Theorem 2.3. If a mechanism is (λ,µ)-smooth with respect to a solution x, then at any Nash
equilibria of the game, as well as at any no-regret learning outcome, the expected social welfare is
at least max(µ,1)
λ
W (x;v).
Differential privacy. Differential privacy has been developed for databases storing private infor-
mation for a population. A databaseD ∈ Vn is a vector of inputs, one for each player. Two databases
are i-neighbors if they differ just in the i-th coordinate, i.e. differ only in the input the i-th player.
If two databases are i-neighbors for some i, they are called neighboring databases.
In the context of repeated games, every time a player leaves or arrives, the solution may change
drastically. Instead of comparing the game outcomes to the socially optimal solution that changes
with every player change, we will want to compare the outcome to a more stable but close to
optimal solution. The notion of differential privacy offers a useful framework for this goal.
Dwork et al. (2006) define an algorithm as differentially private if one person’s information has
little influence on the outcome. In the setting of a game or mechanism the outcome for player i
clearly should depend on player i’s input (her claimed valuation, or source destination pair), so
cannot be differentially private. The notion of joint differential privacy which has been developed
by Kearns et al. (2014) to adapt differential privacy to settings, where the algorithm has a set of
n outcomes, one for each player. We use X to denote the set of possible outcomes for one player,
so an algorithm in this context is a function A : Vn →X n. The algorithm is jointly differentially
private, if for all players i, the output for all other players is differentially private in the input of
player i. More formally,
Definition 2.5 ((Kearns et al. 2014)). An algorithm A : Vn →X n is (ǫ, δ)- jointly differen-
tially private if for every i, for every pair of i-neighbors D,D′ ∈ Vn, and for every subset of outputs
S ⊆X n−1.
Pr[A(D)−i ∈ S]≤ exp(ǫ)Pr[A(D′)−i ∈ S] + δ
If δ = 0, we say that A is ǫ-jointly differentially private.
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We will see that close to optimal and jointly private solutions along with smoothness with respect
to the sequence of solutions xt, can be used to show the strength of learning outcomes in our setting.
Over the last the years there have been a number of algorithms developed that solve problems
close to optimally in a differentially private way. See the recent book of Dwork and Roth (2014)
for a survey. In this paper, we will take advantage of such algorithms, including the algorithms
for solving matching problems (Hsu et al. 2014) and finding socially optimal routing (Rogers et al.
2015).
Marginal privacy. A recent work of Kannan et al. (2014) introduced the weaker notion of
marginal differential privacy, also in the setting when the algorithm outputs a set of n outcomes,
one for each player. A mechanism is marginally differentially private if the distribution of outcomes
for any one player j is differentially private in the input of another player i 6= j, but not requiring
that the combined output of all players j 6= i should be differentially private in ith input. Our
main results continue to hold even under this weaker notion of privacy. However since no improved
approximation algorithms are known under this notion for the settings that we study, we focus on
joint privacy in the main part of the paper and present the extension in Appendix EC.2.
3. Price of Anarchy for Dynamic Games and Mechanisms
In this section we offer our two main theorems which follow the high level outline presented
in section 1. Specifically, we formalize the connection between adaptive learning, solution-based
smoothness and the existence of approximately optimal and stable solution sequences. We give this
connection both in the context of cost-minimization games and in the context of mechanisms. In
the next section we give an application of the framework to unit-demand matching markets and
bandwidth allocation, and in Section 5 we provide a more canonical approach towards producing
stable sequences by connecting the problem to differential privacy, along with a way we can relax
the stability notion required.
Definition 3.1 (k-stable sequence). A randomized sequence of solutions x1:T = {x1, . . . ,xT }
and types v1:T = {v1, . . . ,vT } is k-stable if the average (across players) expected number of changes
in each individual player’s solution or type is at most k, i.e., if ki(v
1:T
i , x
1:T
i ) is the number of times
that xti 6= xt+1i or vti 6= vt+1i , then:
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
[
ki
(
v1:Ti , x
1:T
i
)]≤ k
Theorem 3.1 (Main theorem for cost-minimization games). Consider a repeated cost
game with dynamic population Γ = (G,T, p), such that the stage game G is solution-based
(λ,µ)-smooth and costs are bounded in [0,1]. Suppose that v1:T and x1:T is a k-stable sequence,
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such that xt is feasible (pointwise) and α-approximately (in-expectation) optimal for each t, i.e.
E[C(xt;vt)]≤α ·E[Opt(vt)]. If players use an adaptive learning algorithm with constant CR then:∑
t
E[C(st;vt)]≤ λα
1−µ
∑
t
E[Opt(vt)]+
n
1−µ ·CR
√
T · (k+1) · ln(NT )
An analogue of the theorem above holds for mechanisms too.
Theorem 3.2 (Main theorem for mechanisms). Consider a repeated mechanism with
dynamic population M = (M,T,p), such that the stage mechanism M is solution-based (λ,µ)-
smooth and utilities are bounded in [0,1]. Suppose that v1:T and x1:T is a k-stable sequence,
such that xt is feasible (pointwise) and α-approximately optimal (in-expectation) for each t, i.e.
α · E[W (xt;vt)] ≥ E[Opt(vt)]. If players use an adaptive learning algorithm with constant CR
then: ∑
t
E[W (st;vt)]≥ λ
αmax{1, µ}
∑
t
E[Opt(vt)]−n ·CR
√
T · (k+1) · ln(NT )
We also show an improved bound for some classes of mechanisms that satisfy an non-negative
utility property and which we will use in our application in Section 4.1. For the case of simultaneous
single-item first price auctions with unit-demand bidders it leverages the fact that by bidding only
on one item at-a-time, player utilities are guaranteed to be nonnegative at all times, and only a
subset of the players (e.g. at most m in the case of an m item auction) are being allocated in any
feasible allocation. Under these conditions, players with no item in the feasible allocation will have
no regret against a deviating strategy that attempts to ”win” the empty allocation. For a general
mechanism M the required Property is stated as follows:
Property 1. M has an empty allocation ∅ in the allocation space. Moreover ui(s∗i (vi,∅), s−i) = 0
and ui(s;vi)≥ 0 for any strategy that is used by the players.
Theorem 3.3 (Improved bound for mechanisms). Consider a repeated mechanism with
dynamic population M = (M,T,p), such that the stage mechanism M is solution-based (λ,µ)-
smooth, satisfies Property (1) and utilities are in [0,1]. Assume that there exists a randomized
sequence of solutions x1:T = {x1, . . . ,xT } and types v1:T = {v1, . . . ,vT }, such that xt is feasi-
ble (pointwise) and α-approximately optimal (in-expectation) for each t, i.e. α · E[W (xt;vt)] ≥
E[Opt(vt)].
For each player i, let κi(v
1:T
i , x
1:T
i ) be the number of times that x
t
i 6= xt+1i or (xti 6= ∅ and vti 6=
vt+1i ).
3 If the randomized sequence satisfies an analogue of k-stability:
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
[
κi
(
v1:Ti , x
1:T
i
)]≤ k (3.1)
3 Observe that unlike the definition of ki(v
1:T
i , x
1:T
i ), κi(v
1:T
i , x
1:T
i ) does not account for changes in the type of players
that are not currently allocated an item in solution xti.
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and players use an adaptive learning algorithm with constant CR then:∑
t
E[W (st;vt)]≥ λ
αmax{1, µ}
∑
t
E[Opt(vt)]−CR
√
T ·m · (k ·n+m) · ln(NT )
where m is such that for any feasible allocation x, |{i : xi 6= ∅}| ≤m.
Removing the dependence on T . In all the theorems of this section there is a logarithmic depen-
dence of the average regret on the time horizon T . This will lead in the efficiency theorems through-
out the paper to require that the probability of change p be at most a quantity that is inversely
proportional to log(T ). As we want to think of T as a really large quantity, one might argue that
this dependence makes the requirements on p very harsh. However, we note that this dependence
on T is not essential and is only for the simplicity of exposition. The quantity that should actually
go into the regret bounds presented in this section is rather of the order of the expected lifespan
of any player in the repeated game, which is of the order of 1/p. Therefore the log(T ) terms in the
theorems of this section can be replaced by terms that are roughly O(log(1/p)).
In Section EC.4 of the supplementary material we formalize this argument and provide a detailed
proof of how to remove the dependence on T in all our theorems.
4. Stable Sequences via Greedy Algorithms
In this section we offer direct arguments to show the existence of stable solution sequences and
hence good efficiency results for games with dynamic population. We prove efficiency results for
the case of matching markets with dynamic population and the case of proportional bandwidth
allocation with dynamic population. Our method is based on a combination of using the greedy
algorithm and rounding the input parameters.
4.1. Matching markets
As a first application we focus on a repeated mechanism with dynamic population Γ = (M,T,p),
where the stage mechanism is simultaneous first price auction with unit-demand bidders (matching
markets). To apply our improved theorem, Theorem 3.3, we need two things: i) that the mech-
anism is allocation based (λ,µ)-smooth, and ii) that there exists a relatively stable sequence of
approximately optimal solutions for the optimization problem.
We start by showing that the mechanism is smooth. (1/2,1)-smoothness of the simultaneous first
price auction with submodular bidders (a super-set of unit-demand valuations) and continuous
bids was known by Syrgkanis and Tardos (2013). We consider discrete bidding spaces. A simple
modification of the result of Syrgkanis and Tardos (2013) shows that if the discretization is fine
enough, then the mechanism is approximately (1/2,1)-solution based smooth. We will present the
more general result for submodular valuations, as we will re-use this fact in Section 5.3, where we
consider more general valuations.
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Lemma 4.1 (Smoothness of simultaneous first price auction). The simultaneous first price
mechanism where players are restricted to bid on at most d items and on each item submit a
bid that is a multiple of δ · ρ, is a solution based ( 1
2
− δ,1)-smooth mechanism, when players have
submodular valuations, such that all marginals are either 0 or at least ρ and such that each player
wants at most d items, i.e. vi(S) =maxT⊆S:|T |=d v(T ).
To get a stable and approximately optimal allocation, we use a layered version of the greedy
algorithm. The greedy matching algorithm considers item valuations vi(j) in decreasing order and
assigns item j to player i if, when vi(j) is considered, neither item j nor player i are matched.
To make this algorithm more stable we define the greedy-layered matching algorithm, which works
as follows. Let ρ > 0 be the smallest non-zero value that a player has for any item. For a positive
ǫ≤ 1/3, we round each player’s value down to the closest number of the form ρ(1 + ǫ)ℓ for some
integer ℓ, and run the greedy algorithm with these rounded values. It is well known that the greedy
algorithm guarantees a solution that is within a factor of 2 to optimal. We lose an additional factor
of (1+ ǫ) by working with the rounded values. The greedy algorithm will have many ties and we
will resolve ties in a way to make the output stable.
Lemma 4.2 (Stability via the greedy algorithm). Consider a repeated matching market
mechanism with dynamic population M= (M,T,p), with m items and n players, where ρ is the
minimum possible non-zero valuation. Assuming T ≥ 1/p, the greedy-layered matching algorithm
with parameter ǫ guarantees that W (xt;vt)≥ 1
2(1+ǫ)
Opt(vt) for all t, and it can be implemented so
that the average (over players) expected number of changes in the allocation sequence or the type
for players who hold an item at the time of the change is upper bounded by
1
n
∑n
i=1E [κi (v
1:T
i , x
1:T
i )]≤
5·T ·m·p·log(1+ǫ)(1/ρ)
n
(4.1)
Theorem 4.1 (Main theorem for matching markets). In the simultaneous first price auc-
tion mechanism with dynamic population and unit-demand bidders, if all players use adaptive
learning algorithms with constant CR and if T ≥ 1p we have:∑
tE[W (s
t;vt)]≥ 1
4(1+ǫ)
∑
tE[Opt(v
t)]−mT ·CR
√
6 · p · log(1+ǫ)(1/ρ) · ln(NT ) (4.2)
where N is the number of different strategies considered by a player.
If in addition we assume that all items get allocated at each round for the minimum value of ρ,
or that the average optimal welfare in each round is at least mρ, that is 1
T
∑T
t=1E[Opt(v
t)]≥mρ,
then we can also get a purely multiplicative bound:
∑
tE[W (s
t;vt)]≥ 1
4(1+3ǫ)
∑
tE[Opt(v
t)] (4.3)
if the turnover probability p is at most C · ρ2ǫ2
ln(NT )
for C = (96(1+ ǫ)2(CR)
2 log(1+ǫ)(1/ρ))
−1.
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Remark 4.1. An interesting feature of Theorem 4.1 is that the probability p is independent of
the number of players n and the number of items m, implying that the game can accommodate
extremely high turnover in player population, as the number of players increases, without losing
in the quality of the outcome. The probability p required for the high quality solution, needs to
depend only on log(1+ǫ)(1/ρ), logN and logT , where N is bounded by
m
ρδ
and the dependence on
T can be removed as presented in Section EC.4 of the supplementary material.
The high-level intuition why the greedy algorithm can sustain such a rate of change is as follows:
At any time-step the only players that incur any non-zero regret are the players to whom the
greedy solution currently allocates some item. Since the optimal welfare is at least m · ρ, if we
want the efficiency to be ǫ close to what is implied by having absolutely no regret for the greedy
layered algorithm we need the total regret in the system to be at most ǫ ·m · ρ. In other words,
we need the regret associated with each item to be at most ǫ · ρ. Now observe that when an item
is allocated to a player in the highest level, i.e. with a value in [ 1
(1+ǫ)
,1], then this player is never
unassigned from that item until he leaves the game. Thus we can roughly4 view the lifetime of
an item as decomposing into p · T cycles such that during each cycle the item transitions from
level-1 players to level-log(1+ǫ)(1/ρ) players. In other words, the lifetime of an item splits in roughly
pT log(1+ǫ)(1/ρ) stable allocation intervals, leading to average interval length (p log(1+ǫ)(1/ρ))
−1
and thereby average regret at most
√
p · log(1+ǫ)(1/ρ). Since we want this regret to be at most ǫ ·ρ,
we get p≤ ρ2ǫ2
log(1+ǫ)(1/ρ)
which is essentially the bound we have in Theorem 4.1.
4.2. Bandwidth allocation
As a second application we focus on a repeated mechanism with dynamic populationM= (M,T,p)
where the stage mechanism is the proportional bandwidth allocation mechanism. Recall the band-
width sharing mechanism, where every player i submits and pays a bid bi, and the available
bandwidth B (which we assume is B = 1 for notational simplicity) is divided proportionally to the
player’s bid, so bidder i gets bandwidth xi(b) =
bi∑
j bj
and pays bi. We assume that the player’s
utility is quasilinear, so if the player’s valuation function is vi(x) for x amount of bandwidth,
then the resulting utility is ui(b) = vi(xi(b))− bi. Following Kelly (1997) and Johari and Tsitsiklis
(2011), we will assume that the player’s valuation functions vi : [0,B]→R are increasing, concave
and differentiable. Further, we will make some Lipschitz style assumptions on the rate of change
of the value functions. Concretely, we will assume the following:
1. Value functions vi(x) are increasing, concave and twice differentiable, vi(0) = 0 and vi(B)≤ 1.
2. The rate of increase is at least ρ, i.e. ∀i, x : v′i(x)≥ ρ.
4 Not completely accurate as players can leave to other items too, but a good approximation.
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3. The gradient is α-Lipschitz, i.e. ∀i, x : |v′′i (x)| ≤ α.
Following a similar approach as in the previous section, we can derive an efficiency guarantee in
this setting too.
Theorem 4.2 (Main theorem for bandwidth allocation). Consider the proportional band-
width sharing game with dynamic population and with valuations satisfying the conditions listed
above. If all players use adaptive learning algorithms with constant CR and if T ≥ 1p then we have:∑
tE[W (s
t;vt)]≥ (2−
√
3−ǫ)(1−ǫ)
(1+ǫ)
∑
tE[Opt(v
t)]
if the turnover probability p is at most C · ρ4ǫ4
α2 ln(NT )
for C = (96(1 − ǫ2)2(CR)2 log(1+ǫ)(α(1 −
ǫ)/ρ2ǫ))−1.
The high-level outline of the proof consists of three lemmas.
• As a benchmark optimization problem, we consider the δ-segmented bandwidth allocation prob-
lem for some δ > 0, where all allocated bandwidths are integer multiples of δ. We show that the
Lipschitz condition above ensures that for a small enough δ > 0, the segmented optimum is not
much smaller than the true optimum.
Lemma 4.3. The social welfare of the optimal δ-segmented solution approximates within (1− ǫ)
the optimum if δ ≤ 2ǫρ
α
.
• To get a stable and approximately optimal allocation for the δ-segmented bandwidth problem,
we use a layered version of the greedy algorithm, similar to our greedy matching algorithm in
Section 4.1. We divide the bandwidth in segments of length δ. The greedy bandwidth allocation
algorithm greedily allocates segments based on the marginal increase in the players’ valuation
function. We will denote as vi,j the marginal valuation that player i has for her j-th segment. Note
that, due to concavity of the valuation function vi,j is a non-increasing function on j and, due to
the lower bound on the gradient, it is at least ρδ. The greedy algorithm is therefore optimal for
the δ-segmented bandwidth problem.
To make it more stable, similarly as in the matching markets, we use a layered version of the
valuation functions where the layer of some marginal valuation vi,j is the highest ℓ such that
ℓ(vi,j)≥ ρδ(1+ǫ)ℓ−1. We will use ℓt(j) to denote the layer that the j-th most valued (as in marginal
values) segment was assigned at step t. We will again select the tie-breaking rule across marginal
values of the same layer to facilitate stability, i.e. previous holders of segments are helped in the
tie-breaks to keep the same number of segments as they had before. We show that the greedy layered
algorithm for the δ-segmented bandwidth allocation problem finds a solution within a (1+ǫ) factor
of the welfare of the optimal δ-segmented solution, and that the sequence of solutions found by
this greedy algorithm is stable.
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Lemma 4.4. Consider a repeated δ-segmented bandwidth allocation game with dynamic population
M = (M,T,p) and n players. Assuming T ≥ 1/p, the greedy layered algorithm with parameter ǫ
guarantees that W (xt;vt)≥ 1
(1+ǫ)
Opt(vt) for all t, and it can be implemented so that the average
(over players) expected number of changes in the allocation sequence or the type for players who
hold an item at the time of the change is upper bounded by
1
n
∑n
i=1E [κi (v
1:T
i , x
1:T
i )]≤
5·T ·(1/δ)·p·log(1+ǫ)(1/ρ)
n
• Finally, we need to show that the proportional sharing mechanism is smooth.
Syrgkanis and Tardos (2013) showed that the mechanism is (2−√3− ǫ,1)-smooth using a random-
ized deviation. To use this deviation in our framework, we want to consider a discretized bidding
space. We show that for every ǫ > 0, the proportional allocation mechanism is (2−√3−ǫ,1)-solution
based smooth with respect to any solution of the δ-segmented bandwidth allocation problem, using
a the discredited deviation.
Lemma 4.5. The proportional mechanism allowing only bids that are multiples of ζ = ǫδ is (2−
√
3− ǫ,1)-solution based smooth with respect to any δ-segmented allocation.
Combining these lemmas, we use Theorem 3.3 to get the claimed efficiency result.
Proof of Theorem 4.2. From Lemmas 4.3, 4.4, 4.5 and Theorem 3.3, setting δ = ǫρ
α(1−ǫ) , we get
that the aggregate social welfare of the proportional allocation bandwidth is (2−
√
3−ǫ)(1−ǫ)
(1+ǫ)
of the
optimum. This is achieved for turnover probability p:
p≤ (ρδ)
2ǫ2
6 · 16(1+ ǫ)2(CR)2 log(1+ǫ)(1/ρδ) ln(NT )
.
Replacing δ , the result follows. 
5. Stable Sequences via Differential Privacy
In this section we formally connect joint differential privacy with the construction of stable
sequences needed by our main Theorems 3.1 and 3.2. In Appendix EC.2 we offer a strengthening
of these theorems that allows us to use marginal differential privacy. Differential privacy offers a
general framework to find solutions that are close to optimal, yet more stable to changes in the
input than the optimum itself. To guarantee privacy, the output of the algorithm is required to
depend only minimally on any player’s input. This is exactly what we need in our framework.
Theorem 5.1 (Stable sequences via privacy). Suppose there exists an algorithm A : Vn →
∆(X n) that is (ǫ, δ)-jointly differentially private, takes as input a valuation profile v and outputs a
distribution of solutions such that a sample from this distribution is feasible with probability 1−β,
and is α-approximately efficient in expectation (for 0≤ ǫ≤ 1/2, α> 1 and δ, β > 0).
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Consider a sample v1:T from the distribution of valuations produced by the adversary in a repeated
cost-minimization game with dynamic population Γ= (G,p,T ). There exists a randomized sequence
of solutions x1:T for the sequence v1:T , such that for each 1 ≤ t ≤ T , xt conditional on vt is
an α-approximation to Opt(vt) in expectation and the joint randomized sequence (v1:T ,x1:T ) is
pT (1+n(2ǫ+2β+ δ))-stable (as in Definition 3.1).
We defer the proof of Theorem 5.1 to the next subsection. Combining Theorem 5.1 with Theorem
3.1 and Theorem 3.2, we immediately get the following corollary.
Corollary 5.1. Consider a repeated cost game with dynamic population Γ= (G,T, p), such that
the stage game G is allocation based (λ,µ)-smooth and T ≥ 1
p
. Assume that there exists an (ǫ, δ)-
joint differentially private algorithm A : Vn →X n with error parameter β that satisfies the con-
ditions of Theorem 5.1. If all players use adaptive learning algorithms with constant CR in the
repeated game then the overall cost of the solution is at most:
∑
tE[C(s
t;vt)]≤ λα
1−µ
∑
tOpt(v
t)+ nT
1−µ ·CR
√
2p
(
1+n(ǫ+β+ δ)
)
ln(NT )
Similarly for a mechanism we get:
∑
t
E[W (st;vt)]≥ λ
αmax{1, µ}
∑
t
E[Opt(vt)]− nT
max{1, µ} ·CR
√
2p(1+n(ǫ+β+ δ)) ln(NT )
5.1. Proof of Theorem 5.1
We will use total variation distance to measure the distance between distributions. For two distri-
butions µ and η on some finite probability space Ω the following are two equivalent versions of the
total variation distance:
dtv(µ,η) =
1
2
‖µ− η‖1 =max
A⊂Ω
(µ(A)− η(A)), (5.1)
where in the 1-norm in the middle we think of µ and η as a vector of probabilities over the possible
outcomes.
Lemma 5.1. Suppose that A : Vn →∆(X n) is an (ǫ, δ)-joint differentially private algorithm with
failure probability β (for 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1/2 and δ, β > 0) that takes as input a valuation profile v and
outputs a distribution over feasible solutions σ. Let σ and σ′ be the algorithm’s outputs on two
inputs v and v′ that differ only in coordinate i. Then we can bound the total variation distance
between σ−i and σ′−i by dtv(σ−i, σ
′
−i)≤ (2ǫ+ δ).
Proof of Lemma 5.1. Condition (2.5) of joint differential privacy guarantees that if we let S ⊆
X n−i be a subset of possible solutions for players other than i and with σ−i(S) and σ′−i(S) the
probability that the two distributions assign on S, then for any S: σ−i(S) ≤ exp(ǫ)σ′−i(S) + δ.
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Since ǫ≤ 1/2, we can use the bound exp(ǫ)≤ 1+ 2ǫ to get that σ−i(S)− σ′−i(S)≤ 2ǫσ′−i(S) + δ ≤
2ǫ+ δ. Thus by the second definition of the total variation distance in Equation (5.1) we get that
dtv(σ−i, σ′−i)≤ 2ǫ+ δ. 
To facilitate the proof we need a simple lemma from basic probability theory.
Lemma 5.2 (Coupling Lemma). Let µ and η be two probability measures over a finite set Ω.
There is a coupling ω of (µ,η), such that if the random variable (X,Y ) is distributed according to
ω, then the marginal distribution on X is µ, the marginal distribution on Y is η, and
Pr [X 6= Y ] = dtv(µ,η),
Proof of Theorem 5.1. Suppose thatA : Vn→∆(X n) is an (ǫ, δ)-joint differentially private algo-
rithm as described in the definition of the theorem. The differentially private algorithm fails with
probability β. We will denote with σ the output distribution over solutions for an input v, where
we use the optimal solution in the low probability event that the algorithm fails. (Equivalently A
could be a randomized algorithm and σ its implicit distribution over solutions).
Let σ1, . . . , σT , be the sequence of distributions output by the private algorithm when run on
a deterministic sequence of valuation profiles v1, . . . ,vT with the modification described in the
paragraph above. To simplify the discussion we will assume that only one player changes valuation
at each time-step t. Essentially we are breaking every transition from time-step t to t + 1 into
many sequential transitions where only one player changes at every time step, and then deleting
the solutions from the resulting sequence that correspond to the added steps. Thus the number of
steps within this proof should be thought as being equal to n · p ·T in expectation.
By differential privacy we know that the total variation distance of two consecutive distributions
without the modification of replacing failures with the optimal solution is at most 2ǫ+ δ. Since,
by the union bound, the probability that any of the two consecutive runs of the algorithm fail is
at most 2β, we can show that the total variation distance of the latter modified output is at most
2ǫ+ δ+2β, i.e. for any t∈ [T ]: dtv(σt+1−i , σt−i)≤ 2ǫ+ δ+2β (see Lemma 5.3 for a formal proof).
We can turn the sequence of distributions σ1, . . . , σT into a distribution of sequences of allocations
x1:T by coupling the randomness used to select the solutions in different distributions σt. To do
this, we take advantage of the coupling lemma from probability theory, Lemma 5.2. If at step t no
player changes values, then σt = σt+1, and we select the same outcome from the two distributions,
so we get P[xt−i 6= xt+1−i ] = 0.
Now consider a step in which a player i changes her private type vi. We use Lemma 5.2 to couple
xt+1−i and x
t
−i so that
5
P[xt+1−i 6= xt−i] = dtv(σt+1−i , σt−i)≤ 2ǫ+ δ+2β. (5.2)
5 One can think of it as sampling xt+1 conditional on xt and assuming the joint distribution of xt and xt+1 is as
prescribed by the coupling lemma applied to σt and σt+1. This is to address concerns that xt is already coupled with
x
t−1 in the previous step.
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Note that this couples the ith coordinate xt+1i and x
t
i in an arbitrary manner, which is fine, as we
assumed that the valuation of player i changes at this step.
We have defined a probability distribution of sequences x1:T for every fixed sequence of valuations
v1:T . We extend this definition to random sequences of valuation in the natural way adding the
distribution of valuations v1:T .
We claim that the resulting random sequences of (valuation,solution) pairs satisfies the statement
of the theorem: the α-approximation follows by the guarantees of the private algorithm and by
the fact that we use the optimal solution when the algorithm fails. Next we argue about the
stability of the sequence. Consider a player i, and the distribution of her sequence (v1:Ti , x
1:T
i ).
In each step t her valuation vti changes with probability p contributing pT in expectation to the
number of changes. In a step t when some other value j 6= i changes, we use (5.2) to bound the
probability that xti 6= xt+1i by 2ǫ+ δ + 2β. Thus any change in the value of some other player j
contributes (2ǫ+ 2β + δ) to the expectation of the number of changes for player i. The expected
number of such changes in other values is (n− 1)pT over the sequence, showing that the sequence
is pT +(n− 1)pT (2ǫ+2β+ δ)≤ pT (1+n(2ǫ+2β+ δ)) stable, as claimed. 
Lemma 5.3. Let q and q′ be the output of an (ǫ, δ)-joint differentially private algorithm with failure
probability β, on two valuation profiles v and v′ that differ only in coordinate i. Let σ and σ′ be
the modified output where the outcome is replaced with optimal outcome when the algorithm fails.
Then:
dtv(σ,σ
′)≤ 2ǫ+ δ+2β
Proof of Lemma 5.3. Consider two random coupled random variables y, y′ that are implied by
Lemma 5.2 applied to distributions q and q′, such that y ∼ q and y′ ∼ q′ and Pr [y 6= y′] = dtv(q, q′)≤
2ǫ+ δ (by (ǫ, δ)-joint privacy). Now consider two other random variables x and x′ where x = y
except for the cases where y is an outcome of a failure in which case x is equal to the welfare optimal
outcome and similarly for x′ and y′. Obviously: x∼ σ and x′ ∼ σ′, thus (x,x′) is a valid coupling for
distributions σ and σ′. Thus if we show that Pr[x 6= x′]≤ 2ǫ+ δ+2β, then by properties of total
variation distance dtv(σ,σ
′)≤Pr[x 6= x′]≤ 2ǫ+ δ+2β, which is the property we want to show.
Let fail be the event that either y or y′ is the outcome of a failed run of the algorithm. Then by
the union bound Pr [fail]≤ 2β. Thus we have:
Pr [x 6= x′] = Pr [x 6= x′ | ¬fail] ·Pr [¬fail] +Pr [x′ 6= x | fail]Pr [fail]
≤ Pr [x 6= x′ | ¬fail] ·Pr [¬fail] + 2β
= Pr [y 6= y′ | ¬fail] ·Pr [¬fail] + 2β
≤ Pr [y 6= y′] + 2β ≤ dtv(q, q′)+ 2β ≤ 2ǫ+ δ+2β
This completes the proof of the Lemma. 
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5.2. Large Congestion Games with Dynamic Population
Our first application of differential privacy is for the atomic congestion game with dynamic popu-
lation, defined in Section 2. Rogers et al. (2015) gives a jointly differentially private algorithm for
finding an optimal solution in congestion games, called Private gradient descent algorithm. They
focus on routing games due to the paper’s focus on tolls as mediators, but their algorithm works
in full generality for any atomic congestion game.
We illustrate our technique with linear latencies ℓe(x) = aex+be. We assume latency is monotone
increasing, i.e., ae > 0 for all e∈E and that be ≥ 0. The algorithm of Rogers et al. (2015) assumes
that ℓe(x)≤ 1 for all e. To achieve this we need to scale latencies by nmaxe(ae+ be). This makes
the functions γ-Lipschitz for γ = 1/n. For this case, the algorithm outputs an integer solution that
satisfies (ǫ, δ) joint differential privacy, and has an error probability of β for parameters ǫ, δ, β > 0,
and for player types v with probability 1−β returns a solution x with cost in expectation over the
randomization of the algorithm
E[C(x;v)]≤Opt(v)+ m
3/2nγ1/2
ǫ1/2
polylog(ǫ,1/δ,1/β,n,m). (5.3)
We can combine this differentially private algorithm with Corollary 5.1 for a class of latency
functions ℓ(x) that we have good smoothness properties. The class of linear latencies ℓe(x) = aex+be
are (5/3,1/3)-smooth (Christodoulou and Koutsoupias 2005, Awerbuch et al. 2013, Roughgarden
2009). The same proof also gives:
Lemma 5.4. Congestion games with linear latencies ℓe(x) = aex+ be for ae, be ≥ 0 are (5/3,1/3)-
smooth with respect to any solution x.
Theorem 5.2 (Main theorem for large congestion games.). Consider a repeated conges-
tion game with dynamic population Γ= (G,T, p), such that T ≥ 1
p
, the stage game G is an atomic
congestion game with affine latency functions ℓe(x) = aex+ be with ae > 0 and be ≥ 0 for all e.
For any η > 0, if all players use adaptive learning algorithms with constant CR, then the overall
expected cost is bounded by ∑
tE[C(s
t;vt)]≤ 5
2
(1+ η)
∑
tOpt(v
t)
assuming the probability p of departures is at most C · η4 ·m−10 · (lnT )−1 for
C =
(
5
12 · 141
)2
· (CR)−2
(
mine ae
maxe(ae+ be)
)4
· (log2(m ·n) ln(n))−1
Remark 5.1. We note that the probability p depends mainly on the number of congestible ele-
ments m, but depends on n only in a polylogarithmic way. For large n, almost a constant fraction
of the player population can turn over at each step.
In Appendix EC.3 we generalize the bound to polynomial functions, and also give additive error
results for congestion games with general latency functions.
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5.3. Large Markets with Dynamic Population
Next we revisit the first price auction game, but consider a much broader class of valuations: we
consider large markets with valuations that satisfy the gross substitute property. Hsu et al. (2014)
give a jointly differentially private algorithm to find close to optimal allocation in markets where
buyers have the gross substitute property, and there are enough copies of each item. This algorithm
will allow us to derive good welfare guarantees for outcomes on adaptive learning in repeated
auctions with dynamic population using Corollary 5.1.
We will assume that the valuation functions satisfy the gross substitute property, i.e., increasing
prices outside a subset doesn’t decrease the player’s demand in the set.
Definition 5.1 (Gross-substitute valuation). For a price p let p(A) =
∑
j∈A pj denote the
total price, and let ω(p) denote the player’s most desirable set of goods, that is, let ω(p) =
argmaxA v(A)− p(A). The valuation satisfies the gross substitutes condition if for every pair of
price vectors (p, p′) such that ∀ items j pj ≤ p′j and for every set of goods S ∈ ω(p) if S′ ⊆ S satisfies
p′j = pj for every j ∈ S′ then there is a set S∗ ∈ ω(p′) with S′ ⊆ S∗.
We will make the following large market assumptions:
1. The number of items ms is large, in particular ms≥ cn for some constant c≤ 1.
2. In the optimal solution each item can be assigned for at least ρ marginal gain. This implies
immediately that the optimal social welfare is at least Optt≥ ρms at each time t∈ [T ].
3. The players are interested in at most d types of items and want only one copy of each item
(meaning that their value for any bundle A of items is equal to the maximum value among any
subset of this bundle with cardinality at most d).
We will use the PAlloc algorithm from Hsu et al. (2014) as our benchmark for adaptive learning.
The algorithm has two additional parameters α> 0 and β > 0, it is ǫ-jointly differentially private,
that is (ǫ,0)-jointly differentially private and with probability (1−β) it computes a feasible efficient
allocation. Assuming the supply s is high enough, the social value of the allocation is at least
Opt−α ·max(ms,n) in expectation, where recall that ms is the total supply, as we have s copies
of m different items each. Concretely, with supply s we get
α=O
(
1
(sǫ)1/3
·polylog(n,m,s,1/β)
)
(5.4)
In order to be able to use this algorithm as a benchmark in Corollary 5.1, we need to show that
this is an approximation algorithm with small approximation factor.
Lemma 5.5. For every η > 1, when the players’ valuations satisfy the gross substitute assumption,
the algorithm PAlloc with privacy parameter ǫ(n) can be used to output an allocation, w.p. 1−
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β(n), that has social welfare at least (1− η
2
)Opt under the large market assumptions listed above,
assuming in addition that
η=O
(
1
ρ · c · (s · ǫ(n))1/3
)
·polylog(n,m,s,1/β(n))
Theorem 5.3 (Main theorem for large markets). Consider a repeated large market mecha-
nism with dynamic population Γ = (M,T,p), such that T ≥ 1
p
where the stage mechanism M is a
solution-based (λ,µ)-smooth mechanism, the players have gross substitute valuations and the mar-
ket satisfies the large assumption. If all players use an adaptive learning algorithm with constant
CR, then the overall expected social welfare is at least:
∑
t
E(W (xt;vt))≥ λ
max(1, µ)
· (1− η)
∑
t
Optt
if the probability p of a player leaving is
p≤C · η
5 · ρ5 · c6
m · ln(NT )
for C =Θ((polylog(n,m,s)−1) where N is the number of different strategies each player is using,
which is at most
(
m
δ·ρ
)d
, when bids on each item are multiples of δ · ρ.
There are several mechanisms for this setting that are (λ,µ)-smooth. As we showed in Lemma
4.1, running simultaneous first price auctions for each type of good (as described in Section 2),
results in a
(
1
2
− δ,1)-solution based smooth mechanism.
A. Proofs of Main Results
A.1. Proofs from Section 3
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Let s∗,ti be the deviation s
∗
i (v
t
i , x
t
i) defined by the smoothness property
and s∗,1:Ti the sequence of these deviations. Let Ki be the number of time steps that s
∗,t
i 6= s∗,t+1i
and ri(s
∗,1:T
i , s
1:T ;v1:T ) the regret that player i has compared to selecting s∗,ti at every step, i.e.:
ri(s
∗,1:T
i , s
1:T ;v1:T ) =
T∑
t=1
(
ci(s
t;vt)− ci(s∗,ti , st−i;vt)
)
. (A.1)
For shorthand, we denote this with r∗i in this proof. Observe that since s
∗,t
i is uniquely determined
by vti and x
t
i, Ki is a random variable that is equal to ki(v
1:T
i , x
1:T
i ), for each instantiation of the
sequences v1:T and x1:T .
For any period [τr, τr+1) that the strategy s
∗t
i is fixed, adaptive learning guarantees that the
player’s regret for this strategy is bounded by
Ri(τr, τr+1)≤CR
√
(τr+1− τr) ln(NT ), (A.2)
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Summing over theKi periods in which the strategy is fixed and using the Cauchy-Schwartz inequal-
ity, we can bound the total regret of each i:
r∗i ≤CR
√√√√(Ki+1)Ki+1∑
r=1
(τr+1− τr) ln(NT ) =CR
√
(Ki+1)T ln(NT ), (A.3)
Thus for each instance of x1:T and v1:T , we have:
T∑
t=1
ci(s
t;vt) =
T∑
t=1
ci(s
∗,t
i , s
t
−i;v
t)+ r∗i ≤
T∑
t=1
ci(s
∗,t
i , s
t
−i;v
t)+CR
√
(Ki+1)T ln(NT ), (A.4)
Adding over all players, and using the smoothness property, we get that
∑
t
C(st;vt)≤ λ
∑
t
C(xt;vt)+µ
∑
t
C(st;vt)+
∑
i
CR
√
(Ki+1)T ln(NT ).
By Cauchy-Schwartz,
∑
i
√
(Ki+1)T ln(NT ) ≤
√
n ·T · ln(NT ) ·∑ni=1(Ki+1). Taking expecta-
tion over the allocation and valuation sequence and using the α-apptroximate optimality and
Jensen’s inequality:
∑
tE[C(s
t;vt)]≤ λα∑tE[Opt(vt)]+µ∑tE[C(st;vt)]+n ·CR√T ln(NT ) (1+ 1n∑ni=1E[Ki]).
By the k-stability of the sequence, we have that
∑n
i=1E[Ki] ≤ k · n. By re-arranging we get the
claimed bound. 
Proof of Theorem 3.2. The proof follows along similar lines as the proof of Theorem 3.1 and
for completeness is given in Section EC.1 of the supplementary material. 
Proof of Theorem 3.3. Let s∗,1:Ti , Ki and ri(s
∗,1:T
i , s
1:T ;v1:T ) be defined exactly as in the proof
of Theorem 3.2, including the shorthand of r∗i . For any period [τr, τr+1) that the strategy s
∗,t
i is
fixed, adaptive learning guarantees that the player’s regret for this strategy is bounded by
Ri(τr, τr+1)≤CR
√
(τr+1− τr) ln(NT ),
Moreover, if in period r, xti = ∅, then by Assumption 1 we have that: Ri(τr, τr+1)≤ 0. Thus, if we
denote with Xi,r the indicator of whether in period r, x
t
i = ∅, we get:
Ri(τr, τr+1)≤CR
√
X2i,r(τr+1− τr) ln(NT ),
Summing over the Ki+1 periods in which the strategy is fixed and using the Cauchy-Schwartz
inequality, we can bound the total regret of each i:
r∗i =
Ki+1∑
r=1
CR
√
Xi,r ·
√
Xi,r(τr+1− τr) ln(NT ) ≤ CR
√√√√Ki+1∑
r=1
Xi,r ·
√√√√Ki+1∑
r=1
Xi,r(τr+1− τr) ln(NT )
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Let Y ti = 1{xti 6=∅}. Then observe that:
Ki+1∑
r=1
Xi,r(τr+1− τr) =
T∑
t=1
Y ti .
Replacing in the previous inequality, summing over all players and using Cauchy-Swartz:
n∑
i=1
r∗i ≤
n∑
i=1
CR
√√√√Ki+1∑
r=1
Xi,r ·
√√√√ T∑
t=1
Y ti ln(NT ) ≤ CR ·
√√√√ n∑
i=1
Ki+1∑
r=1
Xi,r ·
√√√√ n∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
Y ti ln(NT )
Since each xt is a feasible allocation:
∑n
i=1 Y
t
i ≤m. Hence,
∑n
i=1
∑T
t=1 Y
t
i ≤mT . Moreover:
n∑
i=1
Ki+1∑
r=1
Xi,r ≤
n∑
i=1
Ki∑
r=1
Xi,r+
n∑
i=1
Xi,Ki+1 =
n∑
i=1
Ki∑
r=1
Xi,r+
n∑
i=1
Y Ti ≤ m+
n∑
i=1
Ki∑
r=1
Xi,r
Now observe that for each instance of (v1:T , x1:T ):
∑Ki
r=1Xi,r ≤ κi(v1:T , x1:T ), since the latter sum-
mation sums all changes in type or allocation ranging from r = 1 to Ki, such that the allocation
xτri in the period right before the r-th change is non-empty. This is at most the set of changes that
are accounted in κi(v
1:T , x1:T ). It is an inequality as there could be an index r at which both a
type and an allocation is changing and the summation only accounts it once, while κi(v
1:T , x1:T )
counts it twice, or there could be changes where xti 6= xt−1i and xti 6= ∅, which are not accounted in
the above, but are accounted in κi(v
1:T , x1:T ). Combining all the above we get:
n∑
i=1
r∗i ≤ CR
√√√√m+ n∑
i=1
κi(v1:T , x1:T ) ·
√
mT ln(NT )
By the no-regret property of each player, for each instance of x1:T and v1:T , we have:
T∑
t=1
ui(s
t;vt) ≥
T∑
t=1
ui(s
∗,t
i , s
t
−i;v
t)− r∗i
Adding over all players, and using the smoothness property and the bound on the sum of regrets,
we get that
∑
t
∑
i
ui(s
t;vt) ≥ λ
∑
t
W (xt;vt)−µ
∑
t
R(st)−CR
√√√√m+ n∑
i=1
κi(v1:T , x1:T ) ·
√
mT ln(NT )
Taking expectation over the allocation and valuation sequence and using the α-approximate opti-
mality and Jensen’s inequality:
∑
t
∑
i
E[ui(s
t;vt)]≥ λ
α
∑
t
E[Opt(vt)]−µ
∑
t
E[R(st)]−CR
√√√√m+ n∑
i=1
E[κi(v1:T , x1:T )] ·
√
mT ln(NT ).
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By the analogue of k-stability of the sequence, as defined in Equation (3.1), we have that
n∑
i=1
E[κi(v
1:T , x1:T )]≤ k ·n.
By re-arranging and using the fact thatW (st;vt) =
∑
i ui(s
t;vt)+R(st) and thatR(st)≤W (st;vt)
(since utilities are non-negative), we get the claimed bound. 
A.2. Proofs from Section 4.1
Proof of Lemma 4.1 The proof is similar to the proof of Syrgkanis and Tardos (2013) that the
mechanism is (1/2,1)-smoothness for continuous bids. Hence, we defer this proof to Appendix EC.5
of the supplementary material. 
Proof of Lemma 4.2. The 2(1 + ǫ)-approximation result holds as we lose an approximation
factor of 2 due to the greedy algorithm and another approximation factor of (1 + ǫ) due to the
layers.
To show the stability let ℓ(vi(j)) be the highest ℓ such that ℓ(vi(j))≥ ρ(1+ǫ)ℓ−1, i.e., the rounded
version of vi(j) is ρ(1+ ǫ)
ℓ(vi(j))−1, which we call the layer of this value. For example, any value in
the range [ρ, ρ(1+ ǫ)) is in layer 1. Let ℓt(j) denote ℓ(vi(j)) if item j is assigned to player i at time
t, and let ℓt(j) = 0 if item j is not assigned at time t. We will use the potential function
Φ(xt) =
∑
j
ℓt(j)
to show stability.
We will show that changes in assignments correspond to increases in the potential function, and
the potential function can only decrease due to departures.
When a player who was assigned item j leaves at time t, this immediately decreases the potential
function by ℓt(j) ≤ log(1+ǫ)(1/ρ). Next we see how to restore the layered greedy solution after a
departure and after an arrival. We will claim that each change in the solution corresponds to an
increase in the potential function.
To get the desired stability, we will only reassign an item j from a player i to a different player
i′ if ℓ(vi′(j))> ℓ(vi(j)), that is, if the rounded value is higher. If this is the case, we say that i is
eligible to be reassigned to item j, and similarly, we will say that player i is eligible to be moved
from an item j to a different item j′ if ℓ(vi(j′))> ℓ(vi(j)).
When a new player i arrives, we assign the player to her highest valued item j to which she
is eligible to be assigned. This increases the potential function by at least one. Now the previous
owner of the item j has no allocation, and again we assign this player to her highest value item to
which she is eligible to be reassigned, further increasing the potential function. We continue this
process till a layered greedy solution is obtained.
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After a player departs, the remaining solution may have an item j that is unassigned. We reassign
item j to the eligible player i of highest value. This increases the potential function, but possibly
leaves a different item, one that i used to have, unassigned. Again we assign this item to the eligible
player of highest value for the item, further increasing the potential function. We continue this
process till a layered greedy solution is obtained.
We have shown that each change in the assignment, other than player departures, increases the
potential function Φ allowing us to bound the expected number of changes. Each step t, each of
the up to m players with assigned item leaves with probability p, so the expected decrease in
the potential function over the T steps of the algorithm is at most pmT log(1+ǫ)(1/ρ). The poten-
tial function Φ is nonnegative, integral, and is bounded by m log(1+ǫ)(1/ρ). This implies that the
expected increase in the potential function during the algorithm is at most m(1+pT ) log(1+ǫ)(1/ρ).
Since each change in the solution also increases the potential function by at least 1, the same
expression also bounds the total number of changes in the allocation and each such change affects
at most two players. Thus the aggregate number of changes in allocation across players is at most
2m(1+ pT ) log(1+ǫ)(1/ρ).
Last we also need to account for the departures (or changes in type) of players that are already
allocated an item. Since there are m such players in each iteration and each is replaced with proba-
bility p, there are mpT such changes in expectation. Thus the total number of changes in allocation
or changes in type of players that are allocated an item is at most m(2 + 3pT ) log(1+ǫ)(1/ρ). The
average change for a player is an nth fraction of this, leading to the claimed bound using that
T ≥ 1/p. 
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Apply Theorem 3.3, where x1:T is the outcome of the greedy-layered
mechanism; the fact that first price auction is ( 1
2
,1)-smooth by Lemma 4.1; and that there is a
stable close to optimal solution by Lemma 4.2 to get that:∑
t
E[W (st;vt)]≥ 1
4(1+ ǫ)
∑
t
E[Opt(vt)]−CR
√
T ·m · (5 ·T ·m · p · log(1+ǫ)(1/ρ)+m) · ln(NT )
Using that pT > 1, we get the first claimed bound.
To get the multiplicative bound, it suffices to upper bound the expected aggregate regret by
ǫ
4(1+ǫ)
∑
tE[Opt(v
t)], which is at least ǫ
4(1+ǫ)
Tmρ, by the assumptions ǫ≤ 1/3 and that each item
is allocated for a value of ρ. To show that this is true, what we need to prove is the following (using
the inequality (4.2)):
mT ·CR
√
6 · p · log(1+ǫ)(1/ρ) · ln(NT )≤
ǫ
4(1+ ǫ)
Tmρ
which is true if
p≤ ρ
2ǫ2
6 · 16(1+ ǫ)2(CR)2 log(1+ǫ)(1/ρ) ln(NT )
.

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A.3. Proofs from Section 4.2
Proof of Lemma 4.3. For a given value M , if we allocate bandwidth to players up to the point
when their marginal value for bandwidth is M or more, i.e., setting xi such that u
′
i(xi) = M
whenever xi > 0 and u
′
i(0)≤M when xi = 0, then the allocations {xi} form the optimal solution
for total bandwidth
∑
i xi. The idea of the proof is to consider this optimal solution to a smaller
bandwidth, and then round each allocation xi up to the next multiple of δ. For a value M let
xi(M) = 0 if u
′(0) <M , and otherwise set xi(M) > 0 such that u′i(xi(M)) =M . So the optimal
solution is the allocation xi(M) for an M such that
∑
i xi(M) = 1.
Now for an allocation xi to player i let xˆi = ⌈xi/δ⌉δ, the allocation rounded up to a multiple of
δ. Now let seg(M) =
∑
i xˆi(M). Clearly, seg(M) is a monotone decreasing function of M , and is
right-continuous. Set M be the minimum value such that seg(M)≤ 1 (Clearly M ≤maxi u′i(0)).
Now we consider the following segmented allocation: for player i such that xi(M) < xˆi(M), or
xi(M) = 0 and u
′
i(0)<M , we set yi = xˆi(M). For the remaining players we have that xi(M) is an
integer multiple of δ and u′i(xi(M)) =M . For these players we set yi either xi(M) or xi(M) + δ
such that
∑
i yi = 1. We note that such allocation always exists, as seg(M
′)> 1 for any M ′ >M ,
so there must be enough players with xˆi(M
′)> xˆi(M), using yi = xˆi(M ′) = xi(M)+ δ for a subset
of these players can make the total exactly 1.
Now we claim that the segmented allocation {yi} satisfies the claim of the lemma. Let zi =
yi−xi(M), be the additional allocation due to rounding, and let z =
∑
i zi denote the total rounding
used.
First note that the value of the optimum allocation is at most
∑
i ui(xi(M))+ zM . This is true,
as at the allocation {xi(M)} there is z amount of space left to be allocated, and all players have
marginal utility at most M for additional space.
To bound a player’s utility for its allocation yi, we use the fact that the second derivative of the
utility is at least −α, so we get that
ui(yi)−ui(xi(M))=
∫ yi
xi(M)
u′(ξ)dξ≥
∫ yi
xi(M)
(M −αξ)dξ =Mzi− 1
2
αz2i
where the inequality used the fact that u′i(xi(M))=M for all players whose allocation was rounded,
i.e., who have yi >xi(M).
To bound the utility of the segmented solution, we add the above bound for all players, and use
that zi ≤ δ for all i to get
∑
i
ui(yi)≥
∑
i
ui(xi(M))+Mz− 1
2
αzδ
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Now by the choice of allocation xi(M) we have that
∑
i ui(xi(M)) +Mz ≥M , and so we can
bound the last term by
1
2
αzδ ≤ 1
2
αδ ≤ ǫM ≤ ǫ(
∑
i
ui(xi)+Mz)
using the bound on δ and the fact the first derivative is at least ρ.
Combining these bounds, we get the claimed overall bound
OPT ≤
∑
i
ui(xi(M))+Mz≤ 1
1− ǫ
∑
i
ui(yi)
as claimed. 
Proof of Lemma 4.4. The (1+ ǫ)-approximation holds as at most this is lost due to the layers
whilst the non-layered greedy algorithm would be optimal as the valuation functions are concave.
In order to prove stability we use the same potential function as in the matching markets:
Φ(xt) =
∑
j
ℓt(j)
We will again show that, unless some player who holds bandwidth departs, changes in the allocation
correspond to equal increase in the potential function. Hence, we will show that decrease in the
potential function happens only due to the departures of current holders of bandwidth.
When a player j who is assigned mj segments of bandwidth leaves, all her segments become
free. Hence, this causes a decrease in the potential function of mj log1+ǫ(1/ρδ). Summing over all
the players who have items, the expected decrease in the potential function is equal to
∑
j p ·
mj log1+ǫ(1/ρδ) =
p
δ
log1+ǫ(1/ρδ). This is the same as the expected decrease in the potential function
in matching markets with a lower bound of ρδ instead of ρ and 1/δ segments instead of m items.
When a player i arrives, she either gets assigned to some segments or not. If she does not then
she does not affect the allocation at all. If she is assigned to some segments, given the tie-breaking
rule, it means that her marginal value for the segment is higher compared to the player’s who does
not get assigned to segments due to that. Hence, the potential function increases at least by the
number of segments she gets and she causes no more changes in the allocation (for each segment
she takes, she might affect the allocation of at most one player). The total increase is bounded by
the decrease that is previously done in the potential function hence there is correspondence to the
matching markets case.
The remainder of the proof follows exactly the same steps as the proof of Lemma 4.2, having ρδ
instead of ρ as this is the minimum value of one segment (correspondingly item) and 1/δ as this is
the number of segments (correspondingly items). 
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Proof of Lemma 4.5. In (Syrgkanis and Tardos 2013), the proportional mechanism is proven
(2−√3,1)-smooth. The deviating bid used is a bid selected uniformly at random from [0, λvi(x∗i )]
where x∗i is the optimal allocation and λ is a carefully tuned parameter. If, instead of the opti-
mal solution, we selected any other solution xˆ∗, the same result would hold for solution-based
smoothness. Letting Bi be i’s realized deviating bid and bi be the bid played, this means that:
EB
[∑
i
ui(Bi, b−i)
]
≥ (2−
√
3)W (xˆ∗)−
∑
j
bj
Recall that we defined the mechanisms with a discrete action space. Hence, we will consider
only bids that are multiples of ζ. The deviating bid we will use is the rounding of the bid of
Syrgkanis and Tardos (2013) (to multiples of ζ). Hence the deviating bid now will be B¯i = ⌈Biζ ⌉ · ζ.
Summing over all players that hold items in xˆ∗
EB¯
[∑
i
ui(B¯i, b−i)
]
=EB¯
[∑
i
(
vi(B¯i, b−i)− B¯i
)]
≥ EB
[∑
i
(
vi(Bi, b−i)−Bi− ζ
)]
≥ (2−
√
3)W (xˆ∗)−
∑
j
bj −
∑
i
ζ = (2−
√
3− ǫ)W (xˆ∗)−
∑
j
bj
The first inequality holds from the monotonicity of the valuation function and the discretization
of bids. The second holds from the smoothness condition of the non-discretized version. The last
equality holds replacing ζ = ǫδ and by the fact that, for any δ-segmented allocation x, W (x)≤ 1/δ
(as the valuation function is upper bounded by 1 and the number of players that can hold segments
are upper bounded by 1/δ). 
A.4. Proofs from Section 5.2
Proof of Theorem 5.2. To use the jointly differentially private algorithm of Rogers et al. (2015)
with a set of affine latency functions ℓe(xe) = aexe+ be, we need to scale them by nmaxe(ae+ be) to
guarantee that ℓe(n)≤ 1 as required. This makes the functions γ = 1/n-Lipschitz. We will use the
jointly differentially private algorithm on the scaled problem, with privacy parameters ǫ(n), δ(n),
and β(n) that will depend on the size of the population, and then rescale to the original costs, to
get a solution with expected cost: 6
E[C(x;v)]≤Opt(v)+141n1/2 ·m · (max(nγ,m))1/2 · ǫ−1/2 · log (4m ·n ·max(nγ,m) · ǫ/β) ·
√
ln(1/δ)
6 More precisely, the authors proved that they can find a fractional solution with cost at most Opt+R+4R for R≤
(nm)(2nγ+8m)√
T
+2m · 2 log(2mT/β)
√
8T ln(1/δ)
ǫ
where T = n(nγ+4m)ǫ
4
√
2
and then lose an additional m
√
2n ln(m/β) to get the
integral solution. This can give an upper bound of 141 ·n1/2 ·m ·(max(nγ,m))1/2 ·ǫ−1/2 · log (4m ·n ·max(nγ,m) · ǫ/β) ·√
ln(1/δ).
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where γ = 1/n, and the polylog term is the actual expression in (5.3).
Corollary 5.1 is expecting an α-approximation algorithm, so we need to bound the approximation
factor of this algorithm. To claim that it is a (1+ η
2
)-approximation algorithm we need to guarantee
that
141m3/2
√
n√
ǫ(n)
log(4m2nǫ(n)/β(n))
√
ln(1/δ(n))) ·nmax
e
(ae+ be)≤ η
2
Opt.
A simple lower bound on the optimal solution is Opt≥ nmine aen/m= n2m mine ae, assuming all
players are congesting at least one elements.7 Using this lower bound, and rearranging terms, we
can guarantee the desired approximation bound by assuming that
n≥
(141m3/2√
ǫ(n)
log(4m2nǫ(n)/β(n))
√
ln(1/δ(n))) ·max
e
(ae+ be) · 2m
ηmine ae
)2
(A.5)
To use this solution as a benchmark in Corollary 5.1, we need a small enough ǫ(n) and δ(n) as each
person leaving and arriving causes the benchmark solution to change for an O(ǫ(n)+β(n)+ δ(n))
fraction of the population in expectation. We will let δ(n), β(n) = ǫ(n)/3 and set ǫ(n) as small as
is allowed by Equation (A.5). Since ǫ(n)/β(n)= 3 and δ(n) = ǫ(n)/3, we need:
ǫ(n)
ln(3/ǫ(n))
≥ 1
n
(
141m3/2 log(12m2n) ·max
e
(ae+ be) · 2m
ηmine ae
)2
Let f(n) =
(
141m3/2 log(12m2n) ·maxe(ae + be) · 2mηmine ae
)2
= O
(
m5
(
log(m2n)maxe(ae+be)
ηmine ae
)2)
, and
observe that f(n) = poly(m, log(n)). The latter inequality is satisfied if8:
ǫ(n) =
1
n
f(n) ln(3n)
Moreover, by the latter parameters we also have that ǫ(n)+β(n)+ δ(n)≤ 5
3
ǫ(n).
Now applying Corollary 5.1 to the problem scaled bym ·nmaxe(ae+be) to guarantee the assump-
tion ℓe(x)≤ 1, that the loss functions for every player are bounded by 1, and scaling back, we get
that
∑
t
E[C(st;vt)]≤ 5
2
(
1+
η
2
)∑
t
Opt(vt)+
3
2
CR ·nT
√
2p
(
1+
5
3
nǫ(n)
)
ln(NT )max
e
(ae+ be) ·n ·m
7 Consider the cost minimization problem assuming the latency function of all edges is replaced with the latency
lˆ(x) = x ·mine ae. The value of the original cost minimization problem is at least the value of this new one. The
social cost in this new problem is simply: mine ae ·
∑
e x
2
e. Since each player congests at least one edge the solution
must satisfy the constraint:
∑
e xe ≥ n. By the convexity and symmetry of the objective function, the latter relaxed
problem achieves a minimum when all xe are identical and equal to n/m in which case the value is
n2
m
mine ae.
8 If we set: ǫ(n) = 1
n
f(n) · ln(3n) then: ln(3/ǫ(n)) = ln(3n)− ln(f(n))− ln ln(3n)≤ ln(3n). Thus: ǫ(n) = 1
n
f(n) · ln(3n)≥
1
n
f(n) · ln(3/ǫ(n)).
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To get the desired bound, we need to make sure that the additive error is bounded by a small
multiple of Opt. Concretely, we need:
3
2
CR ·nT
√
2p
(
1+
5
3
nǫ(n)
)
ln(NT )max
e
(ae+ be)n ·m≤ 5
2
· η
2
∑
t
Opt(vt).
Using again the n
2
m
mine ae ≤Opt(vt) lower bound for the cost in each step t, we will now show
that we can guarantee this with the choice of p suggested in the theorem. With no loss of generality
we can assume that ǫ(n)n> 3 (since it holds if m≥ 2 and n≥ 2), it suffices to show the following:
3
2
CR ·nT
√
2p · 2nǫ(n) ln(NT )max
e
(ae+ be)n ·m≤ 5
2
· η
2
·T · n
2
m
min
e
ae.
Finally, we use that the number of player strategies N in a congestion game with m elements
is clearly bounded by N ≤ 2m, and hence ln(NT )≤m lnT . Using this fact, we can rearrange the
above inequality, and guarantee the required inequality if have
p≤
( 5
CR · 12 ·
mine ae
m2 ·maxe(ae+ be) · η
)2
·
(
ǫ(n) ·n)−1
m lnT
=
( 5
CR · 12 ·
mine ae
m2 ·maxe(ae+ be) · η
)2
· 1
f(n) ln(3n)m lnT
=
( 5
CR · 12 · 141 ·
(mine ae)
2
(maxe(ae+ be))2
· η2
)2
· 1
log2(12m2n) ln(3n)m10 lnT
=
(
5
CR · 12 · 141
)2
·
(
(mine ae)
maxe(ae+ be)
· η
)4
· 1
log2(12m2n) ln(3n)m10 lnT
The latter completes the proof of the theorem. 
A.5. Proofs from Section 5.3
Proof of Lemma 5.5. Algorithm PAlloc with parameter α, finds, w.p. 1−β, a feasible solution
with social welfare at least 9 :
W (x;v)≥Opt−α ·max(ms,2n)
w.p. 1− β, assuming (5.4) holds. We will use the ρms≥ ρ · c · max{ms,2n}
2
lower bound on Opt, by
the two first large market assumptions. Now setting α= η
2
· c·ρ
2
with c from the first large market
assumption, we get that:
W (x;v)≥Opt−αmax(ms,n)≥
(
1− η
2
)
Opt
9 The algorithm assumes ms> n and gives an additive error bound of α ·ms. If ms<n, we run PAlloc with an extra
m′ items such that (m′+m)s= a for some a∈ [n,n+ s]. For all the extra items every player has valuation 0 and, by
the way the algorithm works, no user gets extra item in the algorithm’s allocation. Applying the algorithm we have
an error bound of α(m+m′)s≤ α · (n+ s)≤ α · 2n.
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as required.
For a given supply s, the bound from Equation (5.4) required is exactly the one claimed in the
lemma. 
Proof of Theorem 5.3. We apply Lemma 5.5 with a ǫ(n) = β(n) that satisfy the condition, i.e.,
set
ǫ(n) =O
(
1
η3 · c3 · ρ3 · s
)
polylog(n,m,s),
By Corollary 5.1 and Lemma 5.5, we have:
∑
t
E[W (st;vt)]≥ λ
max{1, µ} ·
(
1− η
2
)∑
t
E[Opt(vt)]−Tn ·CR
√
2p(1+2nǫ(n)) ln(NT )
In order to lower bound the second term by λ
max(1,µ)
· η
2
∑
tOpt
t, we boundOptt ≥ ρms as before,
and then it suffices to prove the following:
Tn ·CR ·
√
2p(1+2nǫ(n)) ln(NT )≤ T · η
2
· ρms
Using the assumption that ms≥ cn, and rearranging terms this is ensured by:
CR
√
2p(1+2nǫ(n)) ln(NT )≤ η
2
ρc
Assuming wlog that n · ǫ(n)≥ 1 and rearranging terms again, we get that this is ensured by
p≤ η
2 · ρ2 · c2
24(CR)2 ln(NT )
· (ǫ(n) ·n)−1 =Θ(η5 · ρ5 · c5
ln(NT )
· s
n ·polylog(n,m,s)
)
.
Using the assumption that ms≥ cn, this is implied by the condition of the theorem assumed. 
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Supplementary Material
EC.1. Proof of Theorem 3.2
Theorem 3.2. Consider a repeated mechanism with dynamic population M= (M,T,p), such that
the stage mechanism M is allocation-based (λ,µ)-smooth. Suppose that v1:T and x1:T is a k-stable
sequence, such that xt is feasible (pointwise) and α-approximately optimal (in-expectation) for each
t, i.e. α · E[W (xt;vt)] ≥ E[Opt(vt)]. If players use an adaptive learning algorithm with constant
CR then:
∑
t
E[W (st;vt)]≥ λ
αmax{1, µ}
∑
t
E[Opt(vt)]−n ·CR
√
T · (k+1) · ln(NT )
Proof of Theorem 3.2. Let s∗,1:Ti be defined exactly as in the proof of Theorem 3.1 and
ri(s
∗,1:T
i , s
1:T ;v1:T ) be defined similarly as:
ri(s
∗,1:T
i , s
1:T ;v1:T ) =
T∑
t=1
(
ui(s
∗,t
i , s
t
−i;v
t)−ui(st;vt)
)
For shorthand, we will denote this as r∗i in this proof. Following exactly the same arguments as in
the proof of Theorem 3.1, we can show that for each instance of v1:T and x1:T :
r∗i ≤CR
√
(Ki+1)T ln(NT ),
We sum the latter inequality over all players and take expectation over v1:T and x1:T . Then we apply
Cauchy-Schwartz and Jensen inequalities and the k-stability of the sequence, i.e.,
∑
iE[Ki]≤ k ·n:
E
[∑
i
r∗i
]
≤ E
[
CR
∑
i
√
(Ki+1)T ln(NT )
]
≤ E

CR
√√√√n ·T · ln(NT ) · n∑
i=1
(Ki+1)


≤ CR
√√√√n ·T · ln(NT ) · n∑
i=1
(E[Ki] + 1)≤ n ·CR
√
T · ln(NT ) · (k+1) (EC.EC.1.1)
By the definition of regret for each instance of x1:T and v1:T , we have:
T∑
t=1
ui(s
t;vt) =
T∑
t=1
ui(s
∗,t
i , s
t
−i;v
t)− r∗i
Summing over all players and using the smooth mechanism property, we get that
∑
t
∑
i
ui(s
t;vt)≥ λ
∑
t
W (xt;vt)−µ
∑
t
R(st)−
∑
i
r∗i .
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By re-arranging and using the fact that W (st;vt) =
∑
i ui(s
t;vt)+R(st):∑
t
W (st;vt)+ (µ− 1)
∑
t
R(st)≥ λ
∑
t
W (xt;vt)−
∑
i
r∗i .
Taking expectation over the allocation and valuation sequence and using the α-approximate opti-
mality and Inequality (EC.EC.1.1):∑
t
E[W (st;vt)]+ (µ− 1)
∑
t
E[R(st)]≥ λ
α
∑
t
E[Opt(vt)]−n ·CR
√
T ln(NT ) (k+1).
If µ ≤ 1 we get the Theorem, since revenue is non-negative. If µ > 1, we will show that total
revenue is approximately bounded from above by welfare. Specifically, we will show that:∑
t
E[R(st)]≤
∑
t
E[W (st;vt)]+n ·CR
√
T ln(NT ) (k+1).
The latter is equivalent to showing:∑
t
∑
i
E[ui(s
t;vt)]≥−n ·CR
√
T ln(NT ) (k+1).
We use the fact that players can always play the empty strategy ∅i of exiting the mechanism
and receiving zero utility. Thus it suffices to bound the expected average per player regret with
respect to this empty fixed strategy. Define ∅1:Ti the sequence of fixed empty strategies and denote
r∅i = ri(∅1;T , s1:T ;v1:T ). Then, using the no-regret definition with respect to this empty strategy for
each player i: ∑
t
ui(s
t;vt) =−r∅i
Hence, for what we want to show, it suffices:∑
i
E
[
r∅i
]≤ n ·CR√T ln(NT ) (k+1). (EC.EC.1.2)
Observe that since this strategy and the type of each player i are fixed in the intervals defined
by the changes accounted for in ki(v
1:T
i , x
1:T
i ), from the exact same reasoning as what we used to
bound r∗i , we can also derive that for each instance of v
1:T and x1:T :
r∅i ≤CR
√
(Ki+1)T ln(NT ),
and thereby similarly as in Inequality (EC.EC.1.1) we get the desired property given in Equation
(EC.EC.1.2).
Hence, we get that:
µ
∑
t
E[W (st;vt)]≥
∑
t
E[W (st;vt)]+ (µ− 1)
∑
t
E[R(st)]− (µ− 1)n ·CR
√
T ln(NT ) (k+1)
≥ λ
α
∑
t
E[Opt(vt)]−µn ·CR
√
T ln(NT ) (k+1).
Dividing over by µ yields the Theorem. 
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EC.2. Stable Sequences via Marginal Privacy
Here we extend the Corollary 5.1 to use a weaker form of privacy, marginal differential privacy,
showing that results on marginal differential privacy would have sufficed for our main results from
Section 5. This weaker form of privacy may make it easier to prove the existence of approximately
optimal private solutions. We first state marginal privacy formally and then prove the extension
of our results.
Definition EC.2.1 ((Kannan et al. 2014)). An algorithm M : Cn → Gn is (ǫ, δ)-marginally
differentially private if for every i, for every pair of i-neighbors D,D′ ∈Cn, every other player j 6= i,
and for every subset of outputs S ⊆G for player j.
Pr[M(D)j ∈ S]≤ exp(ǫ)Pr[M(D′)j ∈ S] + δ
If δ = 0, we say that M is ǫ-marginally differentially private.
Similar to joint privacy, we will allow for our algorithms to have a failure probability β, with
which they either return a very inefficient solution or an infeasible solution.
Theorem EC.2.1. Consider a repeated cost game with dynamic population Γ = (G,T, p), such
that the stage game G is allocation-based (λ,µ)-smooth and T ≥ 1
p
. Assume that there exists an
(ǫ, δ)-marginal differentially private algorithm A : Vn→X n with failure probability β that satisfies
the conditions of Theorem 5.1. If all players use adaptive learning in the repeated game then the
overall cost of the solution is at most:
∑
t
E[C(st;vt)]≤ λα
1−µ
∑
t
Opt(vt)+
nT
1−µCR
√
2p
(
1+n(ǫ+β+ δ)
)
ln(NT )
Proof outline. The proof follows roughly the same outline as the proof of Corollary 5.1 (which
used Lemma 5.1 and Theorem 3.1). The outline of the changes needed is as follows.
1. The notion of marginal privacy is not strong enough to allow the kind of global coupling
offered by Theorem 5.1. Instead, we can couple the distributions (v1:Ti , x
1:T
i ) separately for each
player i, while ensuring that each sequence has expected number of changes in either her solution
or type at most p ·T (1+n(2ǫ+ δ)).
2. With no global coupling of solutions, we cannot directly use Theorem 3.1. Rather we need to
prove that the stable coupling of distributions of each player’s value and outcome individually is
strong enough to reach the same conclusion.
We note that, while we can prove Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 without the need for global coupling,
Theorem 3.3, requiring Property 1, does need the global coupling used there. 
We state the claims used by the two steps, and offer a sketch of how to modify the proves used
so far to prove the claims.
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Lemma EC.2.1 (Stable sequences via marginal privacy). Suppose that there exists an algo-
rithm A : Vn→X n that is (ǫ, δ)-marginal differentially private algorithm, takes as input a valuation
profile v and outputs a distribution such that a sample from this distribution is feasible with proba-
bility 1−β, and is an α-approximately efficient in expectation (for 0≤ ǫ < 1/2, α> 1 and δ, β > 0).
Consider the sequence of valuations v1:T produced by the adversary in a repeated cost-
minimization game with dynamic population Γ = (G,p,T ), and let σ1:T be the sequence of the
resulting outcome distributions produced by algorithm A. Then there exists a randomized sequence
of solutions x1:Ti for each player i, such that for each 1 ≤ t≤ T , conditional on vt for each i the
distribution of (vti , x
t
i) is the ith marginal distribution of an α-approximation to Opt(v
t), and the
distribution of the sequences (v1:Ti , x
1:T
i ) is such that the expected number of changes in i’s solution
or type is at most p ·T (1+n(2ǫ+2β+ δ)) for each player i.
Proof of Lemma EC.2.1. This is an application of the coupling Lemma 5.2 for each distribution
σi, where we use the optimal solution in the low probability event that the marginally differen-
tially private algorithm fails. Using the notation from the proof of Theorem 5.1, marginal privacy
bounds the effect of a change in valuation of player j 6= i on the distribution σi. Note that there
is no requirement that coupling is coordinated between the different coordinates, so the result-
ing distribution of sequences (v1:Ti , x
1:T
i ) cannot be viewed as a distribution of global sequences
(v1:T ,x1:T ). 
Next we prove the analog of Theorem 3.1, which will finish our proof of Theorem EC.2.1.
Theorem EC.2.2 (Improved main theorem for cost-minimization games). Consider
a repeated cost game with dynamic population Γ = (G,T, p), such that the stage game G is
allocation-based (λ,µ)-smooth. Suppose D1:T is a sequence of solution distributions, such that the
solution in Dt has cost at most α times the minimum possible cost Opt(vt) in expectation, and
suppose the marginal distributions D1:Ti can be though of as a randomized sequence of solutions
x1:Ti for each player i, such that the distribution of the sequences (v
1:T
i , x
1:T
i ) has expected number
of changes in i’s solution or type at most k. If players use adaptive learning algorithms with
constant CR then:
∑
t
E[C(st;vt)]≤ λα
1−µ
∑
t
E[Opt(vt)]+
n
1−µCR ·
√
T · (k+1) · ln(NT )
Proof of Theorem EC.2.2. We follow the outline of the proof of Theorem 3.1 till equation (A.4).
Then take expectation of the resulting inequality to get
T∑
t=1
E(ci(s
t;vt)))≤
T∑
t=1
E(ci(s
∗,t
i , s
t
−i;v
t))+CR ·
√
(k+1)T ln(NT ).
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Adding over all players, and using the smoothness property, we get that
∑
t
E(C(st;vt))≤ λ
∑
t
E(C(xt;vt))+µ
∑
t
E(C(st;vt))+n ·CR ·
√
(k+1)T ln(NT ),
which finishes the proof. 
We can prove the analogous theorems for mechanisms as well.
Theorem EC.2.3 (Improved main theorem for mechanisms). Consider a repeated mecha-
nism with dynamic population M= (M,T,p), such that the stage mechanism M is allocation-based
(λ,µ)-smooth. Suppose σ1:T is a sequence of solution distributions, such that the solution in σt has
social welfare at least an α fraction of the maximum possible value Opt(vt) in expectation, and
suppose the marginal distributions σ1:Ti can be though of as a randomized sequence of solutions
x1:Ti for each player i, such that the distribution of the sequences (v
1:T
i , x
1:T
i ) has expected number
of changes in i’s solution or type at most k for each player i. If players use adaptive learning
algorithms with constant CR then:
∑
t
E[W (st;vt)]≥ λ
αmax{1, µ}
∑
t
E[Opt(vt)]−n ·CR ·
√
T · (k+1) · ln(NT ).
Theorem EC.2.4. Consider a repeated mechanism with dynamic population Γ = (M,T,p), such
that the stage mechanism M is allocation-based (λ,µ)-smooth and T ≥ 1/p. Assume that there
exists an (ǫ, δ)-marginal differentially private algorithm A : Vn →X n with error parameter β that
satisfies the conditions of Theorem 5.1. If all players use adaptive learning with constant CR in the
repeated mechanism then the overall welfare of the solution is at least
∑
t
E[W (st;vt)]≥ λ
αmax{1, µ}
∑
t
E[Opt(vt)]−n ·CR ·
√
2p(1+n(ǫ+β+ δ)) ln(NT )
EC.3. Large Congestion Games with General Latencies
Considering congestion games more generally, Rogers et al. (2015) assume that the latency func-
tions ℓe(x) satisfy the following conditions:
1. The functions ℓe(x) are non-decreasing, convex and twice differentiable.
2. Latency on each edge is bounded by 1, that is, ℓe(n)≤ 1.
3. the functions are γ-Lipschitz, that is |ℓe(x)− ℓe(x′)| ≤ γ|x−x′| for some parameter 0<γ < 1.
Under these assumptions, the algorithm outputs an integer solution that satisfies (ǫ, δ) joint dif-
ferential privacy, and has an error probability of β for parameters ǫ, δ, β > 0, and for player types
v with probability 1−β returns a solution x with close to minimum cost:
C(x;v)≤Opt(v)+ 20m
3/2n
√
γ√
ǫ
log
(
2m2n2γǫ(n)/β(n)
)√
ln
(
1/δ(n)
)
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Polynomial Latencies. Using this algorithm, we can extend the result for Linear Congestion
games in Section 5.2 to polynomial latency functions. Consider congestion games with latency
functions are polynomial of the form
ℓe(x) =
d∑
j=0
ae,jx
j
with ae,d > 0 and ae,j ≥ 0 for all j. More formally:
Theorem EC.3.1. Consider a repeated congestion game with dynamic population Γ = (G,T, p),
such that T ≥ 1
p
, the stage game G is an atomic (λ,µ) allocation based smooth congestion game
with polynomial latency functions ℓe(x) =
∑d
j=0 ae,jx
j with ae,d > 0 and ae,j ≥ 0 for all e and j 6= d.
For any η > 0, if all players use adaptive learning algorithms with constant CR then the overall
expected cost is bounded by
∑
tE[C(s
t;vt)]≤ λ
1−µ (1+ η)
∑
tOpt(v
t)
assuming the probability p of departures is at most: C · η4 (d ·m4d+6)−1 · (ln(T ))−1 for some
C =Θ
((
mine ae
maxe(
∑
e ae,d)
)4
· (CR)−2 ·
(
log2(6m2n) log(3n)d
)−1)
.
Proof of Theorem EC.3.1. The proof follows the same steps with the proof of Theorem 5.2.
Here we will illustrate just the places where the analysis differs. Similarly to there, let ǫ(n),δ(n)
and β(n) be the privacy parameters of the algorithm.
In order to make the latency function on each edge bounded by 1 as required by the algorithm,
we need to scale the latency of each edge by an upper bound on it. As upper bound, we will use
nd
(
maxe
∑d
j=0 ae,j
)
. Recall that for affine latencies, this upper bound was nmaxe(ae+ be) so here
we are using its natural extension to polynomials of degree d.
This scaling down also makes the latencies d/n-Lipschitz, as required by the algorithm:
ℓe(n)− ℓe(n− 1)
nd
(
maxe
∑d
j=0 ae,j
) ≤
(
nd− (n− 1)d) · (maxe∑dj=0 ae,j)
nd
(
maxe
∑d
j=0 ae,j
) ≤ d ·nd−1
nd
=
d
n
Similarly with the affine case, to claim that this is a (1+ η
2
)-approximation algorithm, we need to
guarantee that
141m3/2
√
nd√
ǫ(n)
log
(
4m2ndǫ(n)/β(n)
)√
ln
(
1/δ(n)
) ·nd(max
e
d∑
j=0
ae,j
)≤ η
2
Opt
The lower bound we will use for the optimum is: Opt ≥ nmine ae,d
(
n
m
)d
= n
d+1
md
mine ae,d again
assuming that each player congests at least one elements, and using the fact that all latency
functions are degree d. Hence, the desired approximation bound is guaranteed for:
n≥
(141m3/2√d√
ǫ(n)
log
(
4m2ndǫ(n)/β(n)
)√
ln
(
1/δ(n)
) · 2md
ηmine ae,d
)2
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The rest of the proof goes as the proof of Theorem 5.2 replacing ǫ(n) and the upper and lower
bounds accordingly. 
General Congestion Games. We can use algorithm in the proof of Corollary 5.1 for general con-
gestion games satisfying the conditions of (Rogers et al. 2015), and we get the following Theorem.
Theorem EC.3.2. Consider a repeated congestion game with dynamic population Γ = (G,T, p),
such that the stage game G is allocation based (λ,µ)-smooth and T ≥ 1
p
. Assume the game satisfies
the conditions above. For any parameters ǫ, δ, β > 0, if all players use adaptive learning algorithms
with constant CR in the repeated game then the overall cost of the solution is at most:
∑
t
E[C(st;vt)]≤ λ
1−µ
∑
t
Opt(vt)+
nmT
1−µO˜
(√
p(1+n(ǫ+β+ δ))+λm1/2γ1/2ǫ−1/2
)
where the O˜ is a polylog term in N,T, ǫ,1/δ,1/β,n,m.
Proof of Theorem EC.3.2. A small technical difficulty in using the proof of Corollary 5.1 in a
black box form is that Corollary 5.1, as well as the main Theorem 3.1 used to prove it, are stated
with multiplicative error bounds. However, using the additive error in the proof of Theorem 3.1,
we get the following, where vt is the type vector of players, st is the strategy vector played at time
t, and xt is the allocation that the differentially private algorithm generates. The assumption for
congestion games was that each individual latency is bounded by 1. Dividing each latency function
by m, the number of edges to make the total latency bounded by 1, or equivalently scaling down
the error bounds from Corollary 5.1 by a factor of m, we get
∑
t
E[C(st;vt)]≤ λ
∑
t
E[C(xt;vt)]+µ
∑
t
E[C(st;vt)]+nmTCR
√
2p
(
1+n(ǫ+β+ δ)
)
ln(NT )
Adding the bound for the quality of the solution x, and rearranging terms we get the claimed
bound. 
EC.4. Removing the dependence on T
In our results presented so far, we have a logarithmic dependence on the total time T the game is
played. Here we show that with a more careful analysis this dependence is not needed.
Theorem EC.4.1. Under the assumptions of Theorem 3.1, the bound can be replaced by:
∑
t
E[C(st;vt)]≤ λα
1−µ
∑
t
E[Opt(vt)]+
1
1−µ ·n ·CR
√
T (k+1) ln
(
2N
p
ln (n/κ)
)
+
1
1−µ ·κT
for all κ∈ (0, n/e)
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Proof of Theorem EC.4.1. In the proof of Theorem 3.1, the dependence on the total time T ,
shows up in equation (A.2) bounding the regret of a player over time. The bound on regret is
derived from Theorem 2.1 of (Luo and Schapire 2015) where regret over an interval of time [τi, τ2)
is bounded with τ2 inside the logarithm. In equation (A.2) we used the upper bound τ2 ≤ T for all
the regret terms.
If all players in our game live at most Tmax steps, we can bound the total regret of the players
in one position i (using the shorthand r∗i from the proof of Theorem 3.1) as:
r∗i ≤CR
√√√√(Ki+1)Ki+1∑
r=1
(τr+1− τr) ln(NTmax) =CR
√
(Ki+1)T ln(NTmax)
With a high enough Tmax, only a very small fraction of the players will live more than Tmax steps.
To bound the overall regret without any assumption on how long players can live, we can bound
the regret of such long living players by 1 in each step.
Let Lti denote the random event that at time t player i has been alive for more than Tmax steps
for a value of Tmax that we will set later. Let also Li,t correspond to the indicator random variable
of the event Lti. Following the proof of Theorem 3.1, and bounding regret by 1 for each player i at
any step t that Lti occurs, we get the following bound.
∑
t
E[C(st;vt)]≤ λα
1−µ
∑
t
E[Opt(vt)]+
n
1−µCR
√
T · (k+1) · ln(NTmax)+ 1
1−µE
[∑
i,t
Li,t
]
.
To prove the theorem, we set Tmax =
2 ln(n/κ)
p
, and we will show that this suffices to get
E
[∑
i,tLi,t
]
≤ κT , which finishes the proof.
To bound the expected value of the sum E [
∑
tLi,t] for a given player i, divide the sequence of
T time steps into intervals Ij of length Tmax/2. For any interval Ij, let Bi,j denote the event that
player i doesn’t change value throughout this interval, and note that the probability of this event
is bounded by Pr [Bi,j] = (1− p)Tmax/2. Now note that, if Li,t = 1, i.e. player i has lived more than
Tmax steps at some time t∈ Ij, there exists a sequence of at most one contiguous intervals ending at
Ij−1 such that player i has not changed value. We will say that player i at time t is associated with
the first interval in this sequence. Note that, with this process, every player i at some time step t
with Li,t = 1 is associated to at most one interval Ij where a bad event occurs. Hence, E
[∑
i,tLi,t
]
is at most the expected number of steps t when player i is associated with an interval where a bad
event occurred.
To get the claimed bound, we note the following facts:
• there are n players (indices i) we need to consider,
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• for each index i we consider 2T/Tmax intervals,
• the probability that this interval is associated with one particular long living player i is
bounded by (1− p)Tmax/2,
• For every player index i, a bad event in an interval may incur an expected increase in E[∑tLi,t]
of at most the expected lifespan of the user after the interval, i.e. (1− p)+ (1− p)2+ · · · ≤ 1/p (as
every player i has a probability p at each step to turn over).
Combining these, we get the bound
E
[∑
i,t
Lti
]
≤ n · 2T
Tmax
· (1− p)Tmax/2 · 1
p
Substituting Tmax and using that (1− p)1/p≤ 1/e we get the following bound:
E
[∑
i,t
Li,t
]
≤ n · 2Tp
2 ln(n/κ)
· e− ln(n/κ) · 1
p
= n · T
ln(n/κ)
· κ
n
≤ κT
where the last inequality follows from the assumption that κ≤ n/e and hence ln(n/κ)≥ 1. 
Corollary EC.4.1. In Theorem 5.2, it suffices to bound the probability of departures by
O
((
mine ae
maxe(ae+ be)
· η
)4
·m−10
(
polylog
(
n,m,η,
mine ae
maxe(ae+ be)
))−1)
.
Proof of Corollary EC.4.1. From Theorem EC.4.1, by setting κ= η
2
1
m·n·maxe(ae+be) · n
2
m
mine ae =
η
2
nmine ae
m2maxe(ae+be)
, together with the conditions of Theorem 5.2 we get that the approximation guar-
antee in the Theorem holds if the probability of departure p is at most:
O

( mine ae
maxe(ae+ be)
η
)4
· (m10 log2(m ·n) ln(n))−1 · 1
ln
(
2 ln(n/κ)
p
)


which essentially is derived by replacing T with 2 ln(n/κ)
p
in the bound stated in Theorem 5.2.
To observe that, note that if we do the analysis in the proof of Theorem 5.2 but using η/2
wherever we used η and replace κ as described, the first two terms of the RHS of Theorem EC.4.1
after rescaling back with m ·n ·maxe(ae+ be) can be upper bounded by
λ
1−µ
(
1+
η
2
)
E
[∑
t
Opt(vt)
]
(given that λ/(1−µ)≥ 1). Moreover, the last term in the RHS of Theorem EC.4.1 is also bounded
by η
2
E
[∑
tOpt(v
t)
]
, after rescaling, by our choice of κ and by the lower bound on the optimum
of n
2
m
mine ae.
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Thus the requirement on the probability p is of the form:
p≤ A
ln(B/p)
(EC.EC.4.1)
for
A=O
((
mine ae
maxe(ae+ be)
η
)4
· (m10 log2(m ·n) ln(n))−1
)
and
B = 2 ln(n/κ)> 1.
We argue that p≤ A
2 log(2B/A)
implies Inequality EC.EC.4.1 and hence is a sufficient upper bound
on the probability p. Observe that the function g(p) = p log(B/p) is monotone increasing in the
region p∈ [0,B/e]. Wlog in this analysis assume that p < 1/e, hence the latter monotonicity holds
in this range, since B > 1. Moreover, we might as well assume that A
2 log(2B/A)
< 1/e, since we can
always assume that A< 1/e. Thus if p≤ A
2 log(2B/A)
, then:
p log(B/p) = g(p) ≤ g
(
A
2 log(2B/A)
)
=
A
2 log(2B/A)
log
(
2B log(2B/A)
A
)
=
A
2 log(2B/A)
(
log
(
2B
A
)
+ log log
(
2B
A
))
≤ A
2 log(2B/A)
2 log
(
2B
A
)
=A
Which is exactly inequality (EC.EC.4.1).
Thus we conclude that p≤ A
2 log(2B/A)
suffices to get the efficiency guarantee we want. Replacing
A and B in the latter gives an upper bound of the asymptotic form stated in the corollary and
which concludes the proof. 
Theorem EC.4.2. Under the assumptions of Theorem 3.2, the bound can be replaced by:
∑
t
E[W (st;vt)]≥ λ
αmax{1, µ}
∑
t
E[Opt(vt)]−n ·CR
√
T (k+1) ln
(
2N
p
ln (n/κ)
)
−κT
for all κ ∈ (0, n/e), where the term under the square root improves to an T · m(k · n +
m) ln
(
2N
p
ln
(
m/κ
))
under Property 1
Proof of Theorem EC.4.2. The proof of the first part of the theorem has the same steps as the
proof of Theorem EC.4.1, hence we omit it. For the second part, the proof is also the same albeit
invoking the proof of Theorem 3.3 to replace n with m. The main difference, for the latter result
is that, under Property 1, it suffices to set Tmax = 2 ln(m/κ), as in the second term we add at most
m T
Tmax/2
summands. Hence, we can totally remove the dependence on n. 
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Corollary EC.4.2. Theorem 5.3 continues to hold with an extra η multiplicative loss in
the welfare, even under the weaker requirement that the probability of departure is at most:
O
(
η5·ρ5·c6
m·polylog(n,m,s,η,ρ,c,N)
)
, i.e. there is no dependence on T at all in the upper bound.
Proof of Corollary EC.4.2. Similarly to the Proof of Corollary EC.4.1, we set A= η
5ρ5c6
mpolylog(n,m,s)
and B =N ln(1/η ·ρ · c). The claim then follows from the previous theorem by setting κ= η ·ρ · c ·n

Corollary EC.4.3. Theorem 4.1 continues to hold with an extra ǫ multiplicative loss in
the welfare, even under the weaker requirement that the probability of departure is at most:
O
(
ρ2ǫ2
log(1+ǫ)(1/ρ)polylog(N,ρ,ǫ)
)
, i.e. there is no dependence on T at all in the upper bound.
Proof of Corollary EC.4.3. Again similarly to the Proof of Corollary EC.4.1, we set A =
ρ2ǫ2
96·(1+ǫ)2 log(1+ǫ)(1/ρ) and B = N ln
(
1/(ǫρ)
)
. The claim then follows from the previous theorem by
setting κ= ǫ ·mρ 
Corollary EC.4.4. Theorem 4.2 continues to hold with an extra ǫ multiplicative loss in
the welfare, even under the weaker requirement that the probability of departure is at most:
ρ4ǫ4
96α2(1−ǫ2)2 log(1+ǫ)(α(1−ǫ)/ρ2ǫ) ln(NT ) , i.e. there is no dependence on T at all in the upper bound.
Proof of Corollary EC.4.4. Similarly to the proof of Corollary EC.4.3, we set A= ρ
2δ2ǫ2
96α2(1−ǫ)2 and
B =N ln(1/(ǫρδ) where δ = ǫρ
α(1−ǫ) . The claim then follows from the previous theorem by setting
κ= ǫρ. 
EC.5. Smoothness of First Price Auction with Discrete Bid Spaces
Lemma 4.1 The simultaneous first price mechanism where players are restricted to bid on at most
d items and on each item submit a bid that is a multiple of δ ·ρ, is a solution based ( 1
2
− δ,1)-smooth
mechanism, when players have submodular valuations, such that all marginals are either 0 or at
least ρ and such that each player wants at most d items, i.e. vi(S) =maxT⊆S:|T |=d v(T ).
Proof of Lemma 4.1 Consider a valuation profile v = (v1, . . . , vn) for the n players and a bid
profile b= (b1, . . . , bn). Each valuation vi is submodular and thereby also falls into the class of XOS
valuations Lehmann et al. (2001), i.e. it can be expressed as a maximum over additive valuations.
More formally, for some index set Li:
vi(S) =max
ℓ∈Li
∑
j∈S
aℓij
Moreover, by the assumption that marginals are either 0 or at least ρ, it can be easily shown that
aℓij is either 0 or at least ρ. Moreover, when the player has value for at most d types of items, it
can also be shown that for any ℓ∈Li at most d of the (aℓij)j∈[m] will be non-zero.
ec12 Lykouris, Syrgkanis and Tardos: Learning and Efficiency in Games with Dynamic Population
Consider a feasible allocation x= (x1, . . . , xn) of the items to the bidders, where xi is the set of
types of items allocated to player i (the latter is feasible if each item is never allocated more than
its supply). Consider the following deviation b∗i (vi, xi) that is related to the valuation vi of player i
and to allocation xi: Let ℓ
∗(xi) = argmaxℓ∈Li
∑
j∈xi a
ℓ
ij . Then on each item j ∈ xi with aℓ
∗(xi)
ij > 0,
submit
⌊
a
ℓ∗(xi)
ij
2
⌋
δ·ρ
.10 On each j /∈ xi, submit a zero bid. This will submit at most d non-zero bids.
Now we argue that this deviations imply the solution based smooth property. Let pj(b) be the
lowest winning bid on item j, under bid profile b. Observe that for each j, if pj(b)<
⌊
a
ℓ∗(xi)
ij
2
⌋
δ·ρ
,
the player wins item j and pays
⌊
a
ℓ∗(xi)
ij
2
⌋
δ·ρ
. Thus we get:
ui(b
∗
i (vi, xi), b−i;vi)≥
∑
j∈xi

aℓ∗(xi)ij −
⌊
aℓ
∗(xi)
ij
2
⌋
δ·ρ

 · 1

pj(b)<
⌊
aℓ
∗(xi)
ij
2
⌋
δ·ρ


≥
∑
j∈xi
⌊
a
ℓ∗(xi)
ij
2
⌋
δ·ρ
· 1

pj(b)<
⌊
a
ℓ∗(xi)
ij
2
⌋
δ·ρ


≥
∑
j∈xi

⌊aℓ∗(xi)ij
2
⌋
δ·ρ
− pj(b)


≥
∑
j∈xi
(
aℓ
∗(xi)
ij
2
− δ · ρ− pj(b)
)
≥
(
1
2
− δ
)∑
j∈xi
a
ℓ∗(xi)
ij −
∑
j∈xi
pj(b)
=
(
1
2
− δ
)
vi(xi)−
∑
j∈xi
pj(b)
Summing over all players and observing that R(b)≥∑j∈xi pj(b), we get the theorem. 
10 We denote with ⌊x⌋δ·ρ the closest multiple of δ · ρ that is less than or equal to x.
